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“The disciple is learning when he does not know that
he is learning, and as a result he may well chafe. In
winter, (...) a tree is collecting nutrient. People may
think that it is idle, because they do not see anything
happening. But in spring they see the buds. Now,
they think, it is working. There is a time for collecting,
and a time for releasing. This brings the subject back
to the teaching: ’Enlightenment must come little by
little – otherwise it would overwhelm’.”
Idries Shah - The Sufis, 1964.
Abstract
This document is a collection of three articles developed during the course of my
PhD, which I submit as requirement for the final exam. The three papers focus to
some extent on policy evaluation, applying two main microeconometric techniques:
regression discontinuity design and difference-in-differences. Each paper is briefly
described as follows.
Daylight Saving Lives In this paper I investigate the effect of Daylight Saving Time
(DST) on homicides. As assignment into the policy follows technical reports from
the National Electric System Operator, the Brazilian setup lends itself to both within
and between-states comparison of homicide levels around the date of transition and
during the whole period of DST adoption. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I
find a decrease in the number of homicides by firearms of roughly 9.83% during DST
months. In line with the crime deterrence hypothesis, I show this uncovered effect
is mostly concentrated in hours directly affected by the shift in daylight caused by
DST - i.e., during early evening hours. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest the
shift in clockswas responsible for saving about 5,035 potential victims from 2006-2015.
EducatedCandidates andEfficientBureaucrats I testwhethermore educated candi-
datesmake into less corrupt publicmanagers. Leveraging on a randomized inspection
programand close-race elections, I show that college-degree candidates commit 8-11%
less infringements than their less educated peers, which is driven by a lower level of
moderate – instead of formal or severe - non-compliance. That higher bureaucratic
compliance, however, is not correlatedwith decreased diversion of public funds. Nev-
ertheless, wrongdoing by less educated candidates translate into lesser discretionary
transfers granted in the subsequent mandate, which may result in diminished public
goods provision. Moreover, after ruling out electoral-concern mechanisms, I show
that college-degree candidates spend relatively less with administration, which is
driven by an inflation in temporary staff 36.8% smaller. Taken together, results sug-
gest that differences in widely used measures of corruption do not actually stem from
corrupt behavior being correlated with politicians’ education, but from differences in
bureaucratic efficiency.
Accountability Shock andMarket for Oversight In this paper I tests whether a top-
down shock in oversight and political accountability can strengthen the market for
transparency in public management. As the source of accountability saliency, I take
advantage of an anti-corruption program that selects municipalities for inspection of
public funds through publicly held lotteries, causing exposition of mismanagement
and corruption to be independent of potential levels of malfeasance, pre-existent level
of citizens’ engagement, and pre-existent efficiency of political and legal institutions
at the local level. Results show that disclosure of information on misuse of pub-
lic funds, on average, increases citizens’ demand for information on public affairs;
boosts citizens’ interaction with the Federal ombudsman, also increasing the number
of denouncements and complaints against public officials and institutions; increases
the number of lawsuits filled against public agents both by public prosecutors and
by ordinary citizens; and promotes compliance with transparency guidelines by the
exposed institutions.
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First Chapter
Daylight Saving Lives
1.1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the effect of daylight saving time (DST) on homicides. For
that, we use hourly data on mortality over a period of ten years and variation in DST
adoption across states to test if the exogenous shock to ambient light caused by the
policy led to a decrease in homicides.
For the purpose of this exercise we analyze one of the most violent countries in the
world – Brazil. In 2015, the country led the ranking in homicide counts with 55,574
deaths, way above the (more populous) second place, India, which recorded 41,623
intentional homicides. In that same year, the homicide rate in the country was 267.4
per 1,000,000 inhabitants, approximately five times the rate observed in the United
States.1 Like many developing countries, much of this violence is associated with
drugs andwide availability of guns in the blackmarket (Reichenheim et al., 2011), and
matching this profile homicide represents the leading cause of death for men aged
15-44 in Brazil, with 90% of the cases involving firearms (De Souza et al., 2007).
Those alarming numbers are in contrast with the country’s gun-control efforts. In
the beginning of the 2000s the Government passed extensive laws aimed at controlling
the flow of firearms into the country, instituting strict background checks for gun
purchases and registration, andmaking it illegal for civilians to conceal even registered
guns outside their home or business. This is alleged to have saved more than 2,000
lives in a four-year period in the state of São Paulo alone (Cerqueira and de Mello,
2013)2. However, these measures were not sufficient to impose a substantial change in
the dynamics of homicides in the country. In 2014 the number of registered intentional
homicides was 52,336, 3.8% larger than the number registered in the previous year.
In this context, we show that a policy consequence as simple as a shift in ambient
light during early evening hours caused byDST can exert an impact on the relative cost
of committing a homicide in such a way that would-be offenders choose not to do so.
1Retrieved from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC Statistics
(https://data.unodc.org/ - Last accessed on September 6 2018).
2See also the recent work by Schneider (2018).
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We follow the rationale of deterrence in crime-supply, a model in which individuals’
likelihood to engage in crime decreases as the probability of getting caught and the
severity of punishment increase. In this framework, luminosityduringotherwise high-
homicide hours facilitatewitnesses and law enforcement agents to detect perpetrators,
thus increasing perpetrators’ expected cost (Doleac and Sanders, 2015).3
Todo so, we exploit the exogenous intra-day shift in light period caused byDaylight
Saving Time to estimate the effect of light-time in otherwise dark hours on homicide
occurrences. The quasi-experiment induced by Daylight Saving Time can serve as
an alternative potentially as good as randomization to identify the effect of ambient
light on homicides, and hence the effect of the DST policy, as the source of variation is
completely exogenous to criminal decision-makers and to states adopting the policy,
as will be further discussed.
Although recent empirical literature has already exploited DST to identify causal
effects on a broad range of outcomes, including criminal activity (Doleac and Sanders,
2015), to the best of our knowledge the present paper is the first to find evidence
of impact on homicide occurrence.4 This is especially important for a middle-income
country like Brazil, where the burden of state absence falls disproportionately on those
less well-off. If we consider intensity of night light as a proxy for public outdoors
illumination, while Brazil has a share of urban population 80% greater than that of
Guatemala, and a GDP per capita roughly twice as great, the former is less lit than
the latter throughout the whole distribution of night time illumination (Henderson,
Storeygard and Weil, 2012). Our findings thus may suggest that policies as simple as
providing adequate public illumination can significantly deter lethal violence.
On a more general perspective, we provide important input into the debate con-
cerning the cost-effectiveness of DST. There is a constitutional amendment process
3This may seem controversial at first, since someone’s likelihood of interacting with a criminal may
increase if he/she stays out later than he/she otherwise would, thus increasing the “demand” for
crime even as we expect the “supply” for crime to decrease. However, evidence using sophisticated
technology on gunshot detection show that removing bystanders and potential witnesses from public
areas actually increases gunshot incidents (Carr and Doleac, 2018).
4Other examples are Kountouris and Remoundou (2014), who analyze the impact of DST on individual
well-being, Smith (2016), who studies the impact of this variation on fatal vehicle crashes, and Toro,
Tigre and Sampaio (2015) which investigate the effect of sleep disturbances on myocardial infarction.
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currently with Cabinet to extinguish the daylight saving time in Brazil.5 The argu-
ment behind the amendment being that DSTmay have adverse effects on the health of
the population while it brings no benefit to the economy in terms of energy savings.
Along the same line, the European Parliament has recently voted (February/2018)
in favor of reviewing the bi-annual change of clocks across the bloc after a citizens’
petition, which gathered 70,000 signatures, urging Brussels to abolish the centralized
switch in time due to health concerns. Our numbers, however, show that positive
health externalities from DST might have been largely overlooked.
Given the tremendous role firearms play in homicides in Brazil, we focus on deaths
for which firearm discharge was the cause, using data from the Information System
on Mortality (SIM) implemented by the Brazilian Ministry of Health. To provide a
statistically well-founded and accurate estimate of the effect of DST on homicides we
use a well defined control group, namely Brazilian states that by law are not affected
by the policy, in a difference-in-differences framework. This allows us not only to
estimate the effect of DST on the whole period during which the policy is adopted but
also to control for confounding factors. In general, we find that homicides by firearms
decreased during DST months by about 9.83%.
A constant concern in empirical studies is the possibility of the treatment being
correlated with unobservable factors, leading to a spuriously estimated effect. In our
framework, this means that the timing of DST adoption may coincide with an event
neglected by the analysis that is the actual driver of homicide deterrence, though
through channels other than ambient light. In that regard, we conduct some additional
tests to check the mechanism and the robustness of our results. First, we investigate
whether results are consistent with our theoretical predictions that suggest a strong
decrease in criminal behavior exactly in the hours most affected by DST. Accordingly,
we find compelling evidence that the effect we estimate is mostly concentrated in the
hours around sunset, which observe a 28.82% decrease during DST period. Second,
we test for the existence of anticipatory effects by estimating the models allowing for
5Senatebill 438, 2017 - SenatorAirtonSandoval (https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-
/materia/131542 Last accessed on April 6 2018).
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leads and lags, along the lines of Autor (2003). We find that anticipatory effects are
virtually zerowhereas lagged effects are substantial, adding credibility to the common
trend assumption.
Third, we draw fromDell (2010) and Lalive et al. (2014) and design amore convinc-
ing comparison between treated and control municipalities by truncating the sample
to observations falling within a certain distance from the border that divides both
groups of states (DST adopters and non-adopters), making comparisons more bal-
anced in terms of economic and geographical features. We find strong evidence that
homicides decreased during DST and that this reduction is largely driven by declines
in homicides around sunset. Fourth, along the lines of Doleac and Sanders (2015) and
Smith (2016), we exploit a three-week variation in the start of DST to estimate the effect
of the policy on dates that are under Standard Time in 2006 but under DST in other
years within adopter states. Again, we find significant effects of DST on homicides
that are concentrated on the hours around sunset. Fifth, we investigate the transition
back from DST to Standard time to check whether the light mechanismworks in favor
of increasing homicides in hours directly affected by the shift. We find positive and
significant increases in homicides on hours around sunset.
As a final and complementary strategy, we use local-polynomial regression discon-
tinuity estimators with bias-corrected non-parametric confidence intervals (Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014) to estimate the short-term effect of the policy on homicide
deterrence around the transition date. Although we are not able to obtain the overall
effects of the DST policy, this approach provides internal validity as comparisons are
made using a subset of observations restricted to a shorter time span around the tran-
sition date, making estimates less susceptible to unobservables, as other factors that
affect homicides should evolve smoothly over the year. Accordingly, we estimate the
effect of DST separately for states that adopt and that do not adopt DST, using daily
and hourly data, and document significant decreases in homicides that are largely
concentrated on hours directly affected by the shift on treated states and statistically
insignificant changes on states that are exempt from DST adoption, confirming our
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hypothesis.
Taken together, these estimates imply Daylight Saving Time is responsible for
saving about 5,035 potential victims from 2006-2015.6 This number is more than 35%
above the total number of homicides that occurred in 2013 in the nineteen countries
located in Northern and Western Europe. Building on the value of statistical life in
Kniesner et al. (2012), which ranges from $4 to $10 million, we estimate that DST
resulted in 2.01-5.03 billions in annual social cost savings from avoided homicides. In
addition to this direct effect, a significant reduction in homicides could also have large
long-lasting indirect effects. For instance, recent estimates provided by Koppensteiner
and Manacorda (2016) using data from Brazil show that exposure to a homicide
during the first trimester of pregnancy considerably reduces gestational length and
birth-weight. This further reinforces the importance of our empirical findings.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes structure
and institutional framework of DST in Brazil, while sections 1.3 and 1.4 present the
data set and empirical strategies we exploit. Finally, section 1.5 discusses the results,
and conclusions are presented in section 1.6.
1.2 Daylight Saving Time in Brazil
DST is a policy designed to save energy and is currently adopted by more than 70
countries, affecting more than 1.5 billion people yearly. It takes advantage of variation
in the distribution of sunlight time between seasons to reallocate ambient light to the
evenings, which is done by shifting the relationship between clock time and sunset by
(usually) one hour.7 In Brazil, DST has been adopted every year since 1986, although
its current form was defined only in the 2000s.
Historically, DST in Brazil has been governed by Federal enactments, usually based
on information from technical reports provided by The Electric System National Op-
6This figure is based in the total number of homicides that occurred during the three months of DST
for treated states in the course of 10 years (2006-2015), which amounts to 46,345 homicides. Our main
estimate suggests a reduction of 9.83%. This leads to a reduction of about 5,035 homicides throughout
the period analyzed — i.e., [46, 345/(1 − 0.098)] − 46, 345  5, 035.
7A review of the origins of DST and its early adoptions is presented in Aries and Newsham (2008).
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erator (ONS). Aiming at maximizing potential energy saving, the National Operator
suggests to the Federal Government which states should adopt DST and the duration
of the regime.8 Given the main motivation for the existence of this policy is the vari-
ation in sunlight induced by the summer solstice in the Southern Hemisphere, DST
implementation does not provide significant benefits for states closer to the Equator
line. This leads to variation in the treatment status across the country. Its technical
basis, provided by the ONS, jointly with the compliance enforced by Federal legisla-
tion, favor our identification strategy since it provides variation in DST adoption both
between (i.e., adopters vs. non-adopters) and within states (i.e., among those that
adopt; standard time vs. DST).
Throughout the entire time spanwe analyze (2006-2015), all Brazilian states within
Midwestern, Southern and Southeastern administrative regions, where light incidence
vary the most across seasons, adopted DST, while no states in Northern and North-
eastern administrative regions did, except for Bahia (BA) and Tocantins (TO), which
adopted DST in 2011 and 2012, respectively, for political reasons (see Figure 1).9 Hav-
ing non-adopter states helps us in designing additional placebo tests, given other
factors affecting homicides besides DST are expected to evolve smoothly around the
transition date in states that did not adopt the policy.
[Figure 1 about here.]
DST in Brazil usually starts on the third Sunday of each October, when clocks skip
forward from 12am to 1am, and extends until midnight of the third Sunday of each
February, when clocks fall back one hour to standard time. A detailed list of adopters
by year is provided in Table 1 below. Aparticular and interesting change in the starting
8We remark “maximizing potential energy saving” as there are controversies over whether
DST policy in fact saves energy (Havranek, Herman and Irsova, 2018). For the 2017-
2018 DST term, the Brazilian Electric System National Operator (ONS) obtained statisti-
cally insignificant estimates of the impact this policy had on energy consumption in the
adopter states - https://agentes.ons.org.br/download/avaliacao_condicao/horario_verao/RE0050-
2018_AvaliacaoHV2017-2018.pdf (Last access on February 6 2019).
9Bahia andTocantins, which are contiguous to adopter states, exceptionally joined aDST termeach. Due
to their geographic position, however, DST had minor relevance in electricity saving (according to the
Government), and following immense popular dissatisfaction, state governors asked to be dismissed
in the following years. In any case, results are qualitatively the same regardless the inclusion of those
state in our estimations.
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date of DST occurred in 2006, when the policy started three weeks later than normal,
on November 5. This provides us an additional opportunity to directly control for
time-of-year effects among adopter states, along the lines of Doleac and Sanders (2015)
and Smith (2016), who considered law changes to DST policy in the U.S. to account for
endogeneity, since DST occurs simultaneously across 48 states (Arizona and Hawaii
do not observe DST) and at approximately the same time each year.
[Table 1 about here.]
1.3 Data and descriptive statistics
1.3.1 Data source
We use data on homicides for the period of 2006-2015 retrieved from the Sistema de
Informações sobre Mortalidade (SIM), the national information system on mortality, im-
plemented by the BrazilianMinistry of Health. This information systemwas designed
to provide daily information on mortality to local and federal authorities, claiming
global coverage within national borders. To this end SIM relies on legal certificates of
death as its data input, which are strictly regulated by the Federal Government.10
Official declarations of death contain two features that provide means to support
our claims, namely time and cause of death according to the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases, ICD-10. Among the “environmental events and circumstances” listed
in ICD-10, we focus on deaths caused by firearm discharge, as they play an important
role in criminal interactions in Brazil (De Souza et al., 2007; Reichenheim et al., 2011).
Since there is serious evidence of a large share of intentional homicides being misclas-
sified as fatal incidents of undetermined intent (Cerqueira, 2012, 2013), we consider
both deaths due to assault andwith undetermined intent in this study.11 The complete
list of ICD-10 codes we use to construct our dependent variable is provided in Table 2.
10Published in October 9th of 2003, Federal Ordinance MS/SVS nº 20 provides a rulebook on the filling
out of declaration of death forms, which are standardized and distributed by the Ministry of Health.
11In fact, evidence regarding systematicmisclassification comes from the Institute forApplied Economic
Research (IPEA), a federal public institution directly linked to the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of
the Presidency (SAE/PR).
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It is important to notice that fatal incidents of undetermined intent do not include
accidental deaths caused by firearms, which are classified under the ICD-10 codes
W32-W34. Additionally, we opt to exclude from our estimations homicides resulting
from legal intervention, since according to ICD’s methodology those are the result
of law-enforcement agents on duty in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest
lawbreakers, and therefore would mistakenly favor our hypothesis, as deaths from
legal intervention are expected to be positively correlated with lethal criminal activity.
[Table 2 about here.]
1.3.2 Descriptive statistics
In table 3 we present unconditional averages of homicide rates for one week prior
and one week after DST transition, disaggregated by treatment group. Columns 1-2
present results at the daily level, whereas columns 4-5 present it for the sunset hours
(i.e. relative hours 0 and 1, with reference to sunset time).12
We note that for municipalities that adopted the policy, the average homicide rate
is 0.467 on the week prior to transition to DST. On the week following transition, it
decreases to 0.437, a reduction of almost 6.5%, statistically significant. If we consider
only homicides occurring around sunset hours, this decrease amounts to about 20%.
These patterns are not observed for those municipalities that did not adopt the policy:
A statistically insignificant reduction of 1.6% is observedwhen considering daily level,
and of 1.98% when looking at hours around sunset.13
[Table 3 about here.]
For further transparency, we plot in figure 2 the evolution of homicides along
several weeks across the transition date. We plot polynomial splines with no controls
12We standardize clock-time with respect to sunset-time. This means that relative hour 0 is the hour
that starts at the exact sunset hour.
13See table A1 in the Appendix for social-economic information on deceased individuals as well as
municipality characteristics for treated and control municipalities. For instance, we observe that
treated States have greater per capita GDP, larger share of the population living in urban areas, and
larger population density, hence the importance of municipality fixed effects (and trends) in our main
specification.
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for each side of the transition to distinguish trends from seasonality caused by an
increase in homicides during weekends. Given the fairly similar pre-treatment trend
between treatment groups, it is reasonable to assume that, in the absence of DST,
adopters (i.e. dark gray lines) would show an ascending trajectory in homicides
similar to that observed for control municipalities (i.e. light gray lines). The former
group, nevertheless, exhibits a minute descent followed by a flat trajectory.14
[Figure 2 about here.]
As a last descriptive exercise, and to support the hypothesized mechanism of
ambient light as a deterrence tool, we plot in figure 3 the distribution of homicides by
hour of the day during DST and standard time. For each treatment group, gray bars
represent the density of homicides in a given hour during the DST period, whereas
white bars refer to the standard time period. Panel (A) shows thatmost of the variation
across transition to DST occurred during sunset hours - vertical dashed lines, which
represent the minimum, mean, and maximum sunset hours of municipalities during
standard-time. On the other hand, panel (B) shows minute differences, if any, in the
distribution of homicides for any given hour across transition to DST.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Despite the suggestive results from the descriptive analysis carried out so far, from
nowwe discuss and apply formal methods to defend the hypothesis that the observed
effect is in fact caused by the policy in question.
1.4 Research design
In this section we present the empirical strategy used to identify the causal effect of
the daylight saving time on homicides. We consider first using variation between and
within states in a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the overall impact
14Note that the upward shift just after transition for control States is a virtue of the adjusted polynomial.
We show below that homicides evolve smoothly around the transition date for States without DST.
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of the policy. Second, to test for the mechanisms behind the effect of the policy
on homicides invoking weaker assumptions, we estimate the short-term effect of the
policy using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) which does not rely on the
common-trend assumption.
1.4.1 Overall effect of the policy
To estimate the effect of the daylight saving time for the whole period of the policy,
we consider first estimating the following fixed effects model,
(1) Hic y  β0 + β1DSTic y +WeekDayi + λi + λc + λy + εic y
where Hic y is the homicides rate in day i, municipality c and year y. DSTic y is an
indicator variable that assumes value equal to one for municipalities that adopt the
policy as from the date of transition and zero otherwise, and λi , λc , and λy represent,
respectively, day of year, municipality and year fixed effects. The day of year fixed
effects flexibly control for seasonality of homicides for each day of the year. For
instance, we might observe more homicides occurring in the first day of each month,
due to employee’s payday (Evans and Moore, 2012).15 Municipality and year fixed
effects control non-parametrically for municipalities fixed differences and year shocks
common to all municipalities, respectively. Finally, WeekDayi controls for persistent
day-of-week effects, since homicides might more frequently occur during weekends
than on weekdays (see the dynamics presented in figure 2).
In this simple model, our parameter of interest, β1, measures the average effect of
the policy during the whole period of DST. It amounts to calculating the difference in
homicides between that observedduring the policy and that observedduring standard
time for states that adopt and states that do not adopt DST.
Accordingly, we estimate the model first using daily data to assess the overall
15Here we follow Smith (2016) and create dummies for each month/day combination (for instance, we
create an October 14th dummy). This differs from creating a dummy for each day of the year, because
leap days would cause October 14th for most years to be matched with October 13th for for some
years.
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effect of the daylight saving time. Since the social cost of crime is high, especially
for homicides, any movements in criminal activity due to shifts in daylight during
early evening hours caused by the policy could addmuch to the current debate on the
cost-effectiveness of the DST. Nevertheless, the number of daily homicides need not
respond to the transition if criminals relocate their “working” activities from hours
directly affected by the shift in daylight to other hours of the day. For instance,
criminals might increase activity to hours which are dark both directly before and
after DST. If they indeed adjust their labor supply, the DST might cause no effect
on aggregate homicides even though light could still affect criminal behavior. To
investigate this possibility, we estimate the effect of interest for different hours of the
day. Following the crime deterrence rationale, we expect to see a strong decrease in
homicides on hours of the day that are directly affected by the transition, i.e., hours
that were dark before the transition date and turned out to be light after transition due
to the shift in clock time.16
In addition to the basic difference-in-differences estimator presented in equation 1,
we employ a flexible event-study specification to investigate in more detail the evolu-
tion of homicides in municipalities adopting and not adopting DST policy (Jacobson,
LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Goodman-Bacon, 2018). To do so, we consider estimating
the model with additional dummies indicating weeks before and after adoption of the
policy to check whether causes happen before consequences (Angrist and Pischke,
2014), along the lines of Granger (1969). We estimate the following specification
(2) Hic y  β0 +
10∑
τ−21
βτ,1DSTτ,ic y +WeekDayi + λi + λc + λy + εic y
where DSTτ<0,ic y is set to one for a given week if municipality c will adopt DST τ
weeks in the future, and zero otherwise. Likewise, DSTτ>0,ic y is set to one for τweeks
after DST transition, and zero otherwise. We consider 21 leads or anticipatory effects
16Accordingly, we might also observe the opposite during hours that were light before the policy and
turned out to be dark after DST. We find no such effects. We note however that most crimes occur
during the evenings (see figure 3). Additional ambient light during mornings seem to provide no
additional incentive to lazy criminals, especially following a one-hour-short night of sleep.
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and 10 lags or post-treatment effects, in the fashion of Autor (2003).
On one hand, this allows us to check the robustness of our results to changes that
might occur close to the implementation of the policy, as our primary identifying
assumption is that in absence of the policy, municipalities adopting DST would have
experienced similar trends in homicides as municipalities not adopting the policy. If
municipalities adopting the policy have pre-treatment trends that differ substantially
from that observed in municipalities that do not adopt, then our parameter of interest
might mistakenly attribute pre-existing trends in homicides to our treatment effect.
On the other hand, by allowing the model to have lagged effects, we can also measure
whether the impacts of the policy are sustained over time or whether they merely
reflect a short-run reaction to the DST transition. For instance, in addition to the
ambient light mechanismwhich should permanently affect homicides during directly
affected hours, the short-term disruption in sleeping patterns caused by the standard
to DST shift may further decrease homicides in the first or secondweek after transition
(Munyo, 2018). This sleep mechanism may affect other hours of the day that remain
either light or dark after transition, via reductions in criminal activity.17
1.4.2 Effect around the transition date
To test for the existence of these short-run effects, we complement our analysis by using
a regression-discontinuity design to estimate the short-term effect of the transition
from standard to daylight saving time on homicides. The advantage of this strategy
is that we need not rely on the common-trend assumption, as comparisons are made
within treated states. The drawback is that we obtain only local average treatment
effects.
We compare homicides before entering DST to homicides after the transition for
states that adopt DST using an optimally-chosen time interval around the transition
17Although there has been surprisingly little empirical evidence on the effects of sleep on worker
productivity, Gibson and Shrader (2014) has shown that a one-hour increase in long-run average
sleep increases wages by 16%.
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date. For that, we consider the following reduced-form model
(3) Hic y  τI(Tic y ≥ 0) + g(Tic y) + εic y
where Hic y is defined as above, Tic y is the running variable, defined as the number of
days to/from transition to DST, which is equal to zero on the first day after transition
and positive after (negative before), g is a (local linear regression) function of that
variable, and ε is the error term.
We use local-polynomial point estimators and recent robust bias-corrected confi-
dence intervals (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014) to estimate τ. In this frame-
work bandwidth selection is crucial since it imposes a trade-off between bias and
variance. Therefore, in contrast to previous literature in this field, we rely on optimal
data-driven bandwidth selectors to set the time interval considered for comparison
around the transition date. Specifically, we show results using the bandwidth selector
outlined in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), hereafter CCT.18
As we mentioned above, consistently estimating the short-run effect of interest
requires the outcome to evolve smoothly around the transition date in the absence of
treatment (once we control for day-of-week and other fixed effects), an assumption
that cannot be directly tested due to the observational nature of our analysis. In
contrast with previous papers, however, and due to our institutional setup, we can use
untreated states to test whether unobserved factors at the national level are spuriously
correlated with the transition date. Hence, we estimate similar models considering
the sample of states that do not adopt the policy.
18As discussed in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), previous bandwidth selectors tend to yield
large bandwidths, leading to biased confidence intervals. We adopt CCT as our main procedure, but
results are equivalent the same when using Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure. Estimates
using ad hoc bandwidths are available upon request and are quantitatively the same. Additionally,
for this analysis, we aggregate the data at the state level, since the CCT selection procedure failed to
find an optimal bandwidth using hourly county-level data due to the large amounts of zeros observed
around the discontinuity.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Main Results
We begin by examining the overall effect of the DST policy on homicides. In panel A
of table 4 we present difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the policy on
daily homicides. We consider four bandwidths around the transition date, presented
in columns 1-4. We find that the homicide rate decreases by .025-.028 throughout DST
period. The consistency of the estimates using different bandwidths adds credibility to
our empirical framework, as results are apparently stable across the treatment period.
Relative to the mean of .293 observed for treated municipalities on the period before
treatment, this represents a decrease of around 9.83% in homicides during the three
month period of DST adoption. Note that besides including a considerable amount
of controls, municipality-specific time trends marginally changes the parameter of
interest, as presented in the estimates of column 5 compared to column 4, adding
robustness to our causal claim.
[Table 4 about here.]
In panel B we estimate the same model, but considering only crimes that occurred
around sunset. As discussed above, the main mechanism behind potential reductions
in homicides following DST transition is the shift in ambient light that affects specific
hours of the day. Following this rationale, we expect crime to decrease most in hours
directly affected by the transition: those in the periods covering the hour of sunset
and that directly following sunset (dusk), i.e., relative hours 0 and 1, with reference
to sunset time.19 Results show that the homicide rate in these hours decrease by
.009-.013, which amounts to a 28.82% decline in homicides, relative to the mean of
.0322 observed on pre-treatment period. We emphasize that in these specific hours
we observe an abnormal concentration of homicides when compared to other light
19Accordingly, hours before (after) sunset include the two hours preceding (following) the sunset (dusk)
hour.
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hours of the day, as evidenced in Figure 3, making this impact quantitatively relevant.
Again, we highlight that our estimates are quite similar when including trends for
each municipality.
1.5.1.1 Event studies
The results presented above suggest that the transition to DST is followed by a signif-
icant decrease in homicides. However, it says nothing about whether these effects are
sustained over time nor does it say anything about whether there were any changes
in homicides on treated municipalities that might coincide with the transition to DST.
If, for instance, we fail to find support for the identifying assumption that there exists
no major differences in homicide trends between treated and control municipalities
before the shift in daylight, then the estimates presented above are likely to be subject
to omitted variable bias. Along the same lines, if reductions in homicides are mostly
driven by the shift in ambient light during early evening hours, we expect to observe
significant effects throughout the whole DST period.
In figure 4 we plot the estimated difference-in-differences coefficients on event
time using equation 2, along with the respective 95 percent confidence intervals. In
panel A we observe the dynamics of pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for
daily homicides, while in panel B we observe this dynamics for sunset hours only.
The small and statistically insignificant coefficients obtained for the 21 weeks before
DST transition support the identifying assumption that municipalities without DST
would have had similar trends in homicides in the absence of the policy. This strongly
suggests that the treatment and control groups are comparable in terms homicides
trajectory and that criminals do not anticipate the shift in ambient light, making DST
transition likely to be exogenous.
[Figure 4 about here.]
On the contrary, the estimated effects in the weeks following the transition are
substantial for both daily and hourly (around sunset) homicides. We observe a sharp
and immediate decrease in crime following DST transition on both graphs. More
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importantly, these effects do not fade away as we move into weeks following the
transition date. Although we observe some variation in the magnitude of the effect,
they are qualitative similar and significantly different from zero.
1.5.1.2 Time allocation
We hypothesize that DST should have the strongest effect during the hours of light
transition, i.e., those around sunrise and sunset. This, however, need not imply
that criminal activity during other hours of the day that remain either dark or light
would not respond to the policy. For instance, criminals could shift labor activities
to the remaining dark hours of the day, or could eventually increase activities during
light hours, as to achieve some predetermined level of income derived from crime. To
investigate this, we extend the results presented above to two-hour periods throughout
the whole day around the standardized sunset hour.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 plots difference-in-differences estimates for each hour-group around sun-
set throughout the whole DST period. We observe that the largest and statistically
significant impact occurs exactly on the hours directly affected by shift (sunset). Al-
though we observe some estimates to be negative and statistically significant for other
hours of the day, which in part suggests that criminals are not reallocating their ac-
tivities, they are quantitatively small in size. For instance, the estimates for 6 and 12
hours before sunset are three times smaller than that obtained for the sunset hours.20
Taken together, we provide suggestive evidence that homicides decrease after DST
transition and that this effect is mostly explained by the light mechanism.
20Note that these estimates need not represent those for the hours around sunrise. For instance, twelve
hours before sunset may coincide with sunrise hours for somemunicipalities located in the Northeast
of Brazil but it may not coincide for other municipalities located in the South of the country. We
estimate the effects of the policy on sunrise hours and find small and statistically insignificant effects.
Results are available upon request.
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1.5.1.2.1 Geographic balance and time span
A potential concern with our results so far regards the fact that the duration of light-
hours throughout the day changes for municipalities located in different hemispheres
as we move along the year. For instance, for municipalities located in the Northeast
of Brazil, closer to the equator, the number of light hours increases as we approach
the summer but by less than the increase observed in municipalities located in the
southern regions. As the number of light hours increasemore inmunicipalities located
in states that adopt DST (see figure 1), we might observe a smooth and relatively
larger decrease in homicides on thesemunicipalitieswhen compared tomunicipalities
located in states that do not adopt DST. Results presented in figure 4 suggest that, if
any, the smooth increase in the number of light hours in DST-adopting states is likely
to be of small importance, as we fail to observe changes in the dynamics of homicides
between treatment and controls municipalities before the policy was enacted, and the
estimates afterwards appears not to increase monotonically with time.
To account for this potential concern, however, we draw from Dell (2010) and
Lalive et al. (2014), and design a more conservative comparison between treated and
non-treated municipalities by looking at regions balanced in terms of geographical
features. Besides differences in the dynamics of light-hours throughout the year,
geography has played an important role to economic development in Brazil. In the
late 19th and early 20th century, for instance, agricultural motivated a state-sponsored
policy that attracted European immigrants with higher levels of human capital to
settle in some specific regions within our treated area (Rocha, Ferraz and Soares,
2017). Comparatively, such events are reflected in local socioeconomic characteristics
such as lower illiteracy rates, improved educational opportunities and, conceivably,
lower incentives to engage in criminal activity.
Therefore, the idea behind the proposed exercise is to truncate the sample to
observations falling within a certain distance from the border that divides the group
of treated from the group of untreated municipalities. That is, for each side of the
border that separates the Midwestern, Southeastern, and Southern regions (which
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contains states that adopt DST policy) from the Northern and Northeastern regions
(containing states that do not adoptDST),we run regressions restricted to observations
that fall within a given distance of that border.21 By focusing on observations that are
closer to the border, we also avoid possible outlying values from large urbanized areas
such as state capitals, which are all located further from this imaginary line for most
of the distances tested. Of course, this comes at the cost of reduced statistical power.
In figure 6 we present difference-in-differences estimates for each group of hours
of the daywhile restricting the sample used in figure 5 to municipalities within a band
of 190km (10th percentile of the distance-to-border distribution) from each side of the
border that divides treatment and control groups. Note that standard deviations are
considerably larger due to a significant reduction in sample size. Accordingly, we find
a large and statistically significant reduction in homicides on hours around sunset.
Estimates for all other hours are virtually zero and not statistically significant. Relative
to the mean of .0602 observed on pre-treatment period, a reduction of -.0156 observed
for the sunset hours imply a 25.8% decrease in the homicide rate.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Following the same logic as above, estimates presented in figure 5 are calculated
using observations for thewholeDSTperiod. Accordingly, since the duration ofDST is
of around3months,wepresent infigure 7 estimates inwhichwe restrict thebandwidth
around the DST entry date to 30 days. This should make hour comparisons less
susceptible to changes in the dynamics of homicides that might arise from differences
in the duration of daylight throughout the year. Followingwhatwe consistently report
above, we find a large (and similar in magnitude) decrease in homicides on the hours
directly affected by the transition.22
[Figure 7 about here.]
21See figure 1. The aforementioned border is the one dividing states in black (RS, SC, PR, SP, RJ, ES,
MG, GO, MS, MT, DF) from states in grey and light grey (AC, AM, RR, PA, AP, MA, PI, CE, RN, PB,
PE, AL, SE, TO, BA).
22Table A2 in the appendix provides estimates for each percentile of distance-bandwidths around state
borders while restricting also to a small bandwidth of 30 days around the entry transition. Results
are consistent and provide similar conclusions as above.
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1.5.1.3 Alternative identification: Using DST extension
In this section we provide estimates of our main results using an alternative iden-
tification strategy. This strategy is somewhat related to the one adopted by Doleac
and Sanders (2015) and Smith (2016) who used variation created by a 2007 legislated
three-week period extension of DST in the US. In our case, we exploit a three-week
variation in the start of DST between the DST terms of 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 (as
previously shown in table 1) to identify the effect of interest. This change creates a
range of dates that are standard time in 2006 and DST in 2007. We use this variation
to estimate the following model
Hic  β0 + β1DSTNewic × Year2007 + β2Year2007
+ β3DSTNewic +WeekDayi + λc + ic
(4)
where Hic , WeekDayi , λc are defined as above, Year2007 is a dummy variable that
equals 1 for the year of 2007 and 0 for the year of 2006 (year fixed effect), andDSTNewic
is an indicator variable that assumes value equal to one for the three-week period of
DST extension, i.e., the period between October 14th (the new 2007 DST entry date)
and November 5th. Note that in this specification we use only data for the years of
2006 and 2007 and consider only states that adopted DST. The parameter of interest
is β1 and measures the difference in the homicide rate between the three-week period
following the 14th of October and the three-week period preceding the 14th of October
for the years of 2007 and 2006. The identifying assumption here is that in absence of
DST transition on October 14th of 2007, homicides in the three weeks following DST
entry in this year would have had a similar trend as that observed in the same period
for the year of 2006.
Results are presented in Figure 8. Again, wefind the effect to be concentrated on the
hours around sunset. All other estimates are statistically insignificant. Themagnitude
of the parameter estimated using sunset hours is the same as that obtained by our
main empirical strategy, adding further credibility to our causal claim. Note that, since
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we estimate this model using only the sample of states that adopt DST and consider a
small window of three-weeks around the 2007 DST transition date, differences in the
duration of daylight throughout the day caused by geographic features is likely to be
of small importance, especially since differences are taken within municipalities for
the same time (weeks) of the year. The estimates presented here imply a reduction of
about 33.4% in homicides for the hours around sunset.
[Figure 8 about here.]
1.5.2 Fall back: transition to standard time
Thus far, we have provided compelling evidence that the transition from standard
time to daylight saving time impacts significantly the homicide rate in Brazil. Now
we turn to check if the transition from DST back to standard time causes homicides
to increase. More importantly, we want to check if we observe significant changes in
homicides around the hours that are mostly affected by the policy change. This would
add strong evidence that indeed we can uncover the causal effect of the DST policy on
homicides and that the main driving mechanism behind this relationship would be
the variation in light induced by the shift in clock time.
Following the same methodological steps described above, in figure 9 we present
difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of leaving DST by each group of hours
of the day. Remarkably, results are the opposite of that obtained when considering
the entrance transition. We find estimates that are either statistically insignificant or
positive, when significant. The size of the coefficient estimated for the sunset hours
is the same in magnitude, but of opposite sign, of that obtained when estimating the
entry transition to DST. Taken as a whole, the transition from DST back to Standard
Time increases the number of homicides in the same way as the one observed when
entering DST and, more importantly, the shift in ambient light appears to be the
driving mechanism through which homicides are impacted.
[Figure 9 about here.]
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We note here that the transition back from DST to ST coincides with the period
around the annual Brazilian Carnival. Carnival occurs seven Sundays before Easter,
which, as a basic rule, usually falls on the first Sunday after the full moon following the
spring equinox in the northern hemisphere. This introduces difficulties in isolating
the effect of the carnival on homicides from that of DST on homicides. For instance,
in some years the carnival happens right before the DST to ST transition, and in some,
right after. This if further complicated by the fact that in some regions of Brazil
Carnival festivities start a few weeks before the actual Carnival. This adds a lot of
noise to weekly/daily measures of homicides. At the hourly level, however, we are
still able to trace a significant increase in the homicide rate for the hours around
sunset, those more likely to be affected, according to our theory and to the estimates
presented above. In figure 10 we plot the estimated coefficients on event time for the
sunset hours along with its 95 percent confidence intervals. We find a sharp increase
in the homicide rate just after the transition from DST to standard time.
[Figure 10 about here.]
1.5.3 Dynamics dissection: RDD
Our strategies so far have relied on the common-trend assumption to infer the effects
of the policy and its potential mechanisms. In this section we employ a regression dis-
continuity design to estimate short-term effects of the transition to DST on homicides
under weaker assumptions.
In figure 11 we plot RD point estimates along with 95% confidence intervals for
regressions restricted to two-hour periods around the standardized sunset hour. In
panel A we plot estimates considering only states that adopted DST, while in panel B
we plot estimates for thosewho did not adopt the policy. Accordingly, we attribute the
exact DST entry dates of adopter states to non-adopter states in a falsification exercise
as if they were experiencing a DST transition. If our story is right, we expect other
factors affecting homicides (besides DST) to evolve smoothly around the transition
date in states that did not adopt the policy.
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We find estimates to be quantitatively close to zero for all hours, but those around
sunset, for states that experienced a transition. The point estimate for the hours
around sunset is -.03, suggesting a large short-term decrease in the homicide rate. For
states that did not adopt the policy, estimates are not statistically different from zero,
including those for the hours around sunset, for which we find a positive but very
small coefficient. Note that here we compare the homicide rate for the same state just
before the transition date with that just after to estimate the effect of the shift in clock
time.
[Figure 11 about here.]
1.5.4 Robustness
1.5.4.1 Deaths before hospital admission
An important remark relates to whether increased mortality during the hours most
affected by DST results from a lagged effect of higher crime levels in early hours that
ended up being spuriously captured by our regressions. For instance, it would not
be surprising if victims that got shot several hours before those most affected by the
shift in lightness (sunset) ended up dying during sunset hours as a consequence of
overcrowded hospitals, reduced hospital staff (caused by work shift friction due to
DST), or a combination of both factors.23
Unfortunately, we are not able to match the time of death of deceased patients to
the time theywere admitted to the hospital in order to check for this potential spurious
effect. To tackle this issue, however, we estimate the effect around sunset as in the
previous tables but restricting the sample to observations forwhich victimsdied before
23Another possibility is that the transition to DST could affect the survival probability of victims,
either by quicker reporting and/or response by rescue and ambulance services. This does not harm
our interpretation that ambient light during evening hours reduce the number of homicides, but
raises the possibility of not being directly the result of reduced criminal activity. Unfortunately,
we do not dispose of a data set at the national level that contains criminal data (robbery, theft,
etc) at the hourly/daily level. We show, however, using monthly data from the SINESPJC (Sistema
Nacional de Estatísticas de Segurança Pública e Justiça Criminal), compiled from police records of criminal
occurrences, that the number of car thefts decreased significantly during the three months of DST.
Estimates for car robbery and for robbery followed by death are large and negative, but statistically
insignificant. These estimates altogether suggest that criminal activity do respond to the shock.
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an eventual hospital admission, thus eliminating the possibility of unrelated causes
being driving our results. This is a conservative estimate, since we lose observations
for which the victim got shot, was quickly admitted to a hospital and ended up dying
briefly after admission.
Table 5 reports estimates of the effect of the policy on homicides for the whole
day and for those hours around sunset. Overall, results are quite similar to those
presented in table 4. We find that the number of victims that where declared dead
before being admitted to hospital decrease by 11.82%, quantitatively similar to the
reduction observed in homicides in general.
[Table 5 about here.]
1.5.4.2 Homicides by any mean or cause of death
To compare the consistency of our main outcome with a broader measure, in table 6
we test ourmain specification using deaths resulting from injuries inflicted by another
person, by any means, with intent to injure or kill.24 The distinction here is twofold:
Differently from our main outcome, now we include homicides by all means - i.e. not
only by firearm discharge but also by sharp object, blunt objects, bodily force and so
on. Moreover, this newdefinition excludes cases of undetermined intent, although it is
advisable not to do so (refer toCerqueira, 2012, 2013, , as discussed in the introduction).
[Table 6 about here.]
In absolute terms, results are virtually equal to those presented in table 4, with neg-
ligible differences at the third decimal place. In relative terms, however, sunset results
with our main outcomes are slightly greater than those using the alternative response
variable. We suppose that not only most homicides in Brazil involve firearms but
prohibition to carry makes homicides by this mean more deterrable by the supposed
mechanisms.
24Here we also exclude deaths from legal intervention.
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1.5.4.3 Excluding day of transition
As a final check, we test whether a substantial part of the estimated effect is conse-
quence of the day of transition being shorter - it has 23 hours instead of 24, due to the
one-hour shift forward in clock-time. In this scenario, a share of the effect would be
simply due to measurement error, as by construction a shorter day poses less time for
homicides to take place.
As shown thus far, different hours of the day have different dynamics in homi-
cides. Therefore, instead of performing adjustments such as imputing the average
hourly homicide rate to that lost first hour, as has been previously done (see, for
instance, Janszky and Ljung, 2008; Smith, 2016), we perform a “donut” regression,
which excludes observations in the exact day of the transition, following a rationale
discussed in Barreca et al. (2011). If the underlying hypotheses are valid, although we
may incur a loss of precision due to less information being available in the sample,
we expect to find point estimates similar to those presented for our main specification
(table 4), which is exactly what we see in table 7. Results are quite stable and show
that homicides decrease by 6.18-9.31% after transition.
[Table 7 about here.]
1.5.5 Heterogeneity
1.5.5.1 Decomposition urban vs rural areas
In this section we explore if urban and rural municipalities respond differently to
the transition to DST. On one hand, municipalities that have a larger share of the
population living in urban settings may benefit less from the additional ambient light
if artificial light is widespread throughout the more densely populated area. On the
other hand, if in urban areas the perception of law enforcement is felt more strongly,
as potential criminals believe they have a higher arrest probability, then we might
observe a larger effect of the policy on homicides as the shift in ambient light will
deter criminals from taking action.
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In table 8 we present estimates of the effect of the policy throughout the whole DST
period for daily homicides (Panel A) and for homicides that occur on the sunset hours
(Panel B). From columns 1 through 9 we estimate the model restricting the sample
for percentiles of the share of urban population calculated for each municipality. For
instance, the 10th percentile corresponds to a 33.9% share of urban population in the
municipality, while the 90th percentile corresponds to having 93.1% of the population
living in urban areas.
We find that the effect of the policy is felt on rural areas as well as on more
urbanized regions. Themagnitudeof the coefficient is slightly largerwhen considering
municipalities that have a smaller share of the population living in urban areas. Since
more urbanized areas usually have a level of criminal activity that is significantly larger
than that observer in rural environments, the percentage drop in homicides during
DSTperiod ismuch smallerwhen looking at daily homicides. For instance, we observe
an 20% drop in homicides for the lowest percentile of share of urban population and a
6.8% decline for the 90th percentile. For sunset hours, we find similar effects for both
urban and rural areas.
[Table 8 about here.]
1.6 Concluding remarks and implications
Isolating the effect of policies on crime-deterrence is often a challenging task both due
to non-random measurement error in crime outcomes and to compound effects that
may come hand in hand with the policy of interest. In this paper we exploit an abrupt
change in light hours, caused by the transition from Standard to Daylight Saving Time,
to measure the overall effect of this policy and its main mechanism - the effect of light
- on homicide occurrence. We take advantage of the institutional framework of this
policy in Brazil which, in contrast to the U.S., contemporaneously divides the country
into a treatment and a control regions based on technical reports from the National
Electric System Operator, and enforced by Federal enactments.
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We use hourly data on homicides by firearm discharge provided by the Brazilian
Ministry ofHealth andexploit thediscontinuity in treatment status fordays around the
transition date to assess the extent to which lightness during otherwise dark hours can
deter homicidal interactions. Our estimates indicate that the shift in light during early
evening hours reduced the incidence of homicides by roughly 9.83%when comparing
treated to untreated states. In line with the crime deterrence hypothesis, we show
that this effect is concentrated exactly within the postulated hours. We provide an
extensive set of robustness checks. Based on the estimated overall effect of the policy,
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest the shift in ambient light was responsible
for saving about 5,035 potential victims from 2006-2015.
These results however should be taken with some reservations regarding other
unanticipated consequences of the policy in question, although those are not related
to the channels analyzed in this paper. While on one hand monetary and social
costs of violence are mitigated, on the other recent literature suggests that metabolic
disturbances caused by this shift in clock-hours with respect to solar time, jointly with
one hour of sleep lost in the transition day, are responsible for a set of undesirable
outcomes ranging from reduced individual well-being (Kountouris and Remoundou,
2014) to increased incidence of heart attack (Janszky and Ljung, 2008; Toro, Tigre and
Sampaio, 2015), and increased risk of traffic accidents (Smith, 2016).
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Figure 1: DST policy in Brazil: 2006-2015
Note: This figure presents the geographic distribution of DST states in Brazil. States dark gray
adopted DST in all years of the sample. States in gray adopted DST once (Bahia in the DST
2011-2012 and Tocantins in the DST 2012-2013). States in light gray never adopted DST.
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Figure 2: Raw data: Dynamics of daily homicides for treated and control regions
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Note: This figure plots homicides around the transition to DST. Each bin represents average of
municipal-level homicides count aggregated by treatment group and day relative to the transition
dates, 0 being the day of transition. Dashed lines represent fitted polynomial splines with no controls
for each side of the transition date.
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Figure 3: Raw data: Distribution of homicides by hour of the day during DST and
standard time
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Note: This figure presents the distribution of homicides by hour of the day. Gray bars represent the
density of homicides in a given hour during the DST period whereas white bars refer to the standard
time period. For each treatment group, vertical dashed lines represent the minimum, mean, and
maximum hours of standard-time sunset for municipalities.
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Figure 4: Full sample: Difference-in-differences estimates by week since transition to
DST
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(B) Event study - sunset hours 0/1
Note: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates in the fashion of leads and lags for weeks
since transition to DST. The specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects,
day-of-month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.
32
Figure 5: Full sample: Difference-in-differences estimates for each hour-group
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Note: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates by each group of hours of the day. The
specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, day-of-month fixed effects,
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 6: Difference-in-differences estimates for each hour-group for municipalities
within a band of 190km fromeach side of the border that divides treatment and control
groups
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Note: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates by each group of hours of the day while
restricting the sample used in figure 5 to municipalities within a band of 190km (10th percentile of
the distance-to-border distribution) from each side of the border that divides treatment and control
groups. The specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, day-of-month
fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 7: Difference-in-differences estimates for each hour-group for a window of
+-30 days
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Note: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates by each group of hours of the day in a
window of +-30 days around DST transition. The specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-
of-week fixed effects, day-of-month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
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Figure 8: Alternative identification - Difference-in-differences estimates for each hour-
group exploiting DST extension
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Effect by hour - Exploiting DST extension
Note: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates by each group of hours of the day while
restricting the sample used in figure 5 only to treated municipalities and exploiting variation in the
duration of DST between the DST terms 2006-2007 and 2007-2008, in the same fashion of Doleac and
Sanders (2015) and Smith (2016). The specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-of-week
fixed effects, day-of-month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level.
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Figure 9: Transition from DST to ST - Difference-in-differences estimates for each
hour-group
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Note: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of leaving DST by each group
of hours of the day. The specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, day-
of-month fixed effects, carnival days fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level.
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Figure 10: Transition from DST to ST: Difference-in-differences estimates by week
since transition back to ST
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(A) Event study - Standard Time - whole day
-.02
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
-
i
n
-
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+
Weeks since transition to Standard Time
(B) Event study - Standard Time -sunset hours 0/1
Note: This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates in the fashion of leads and lags for weeks
since transition to ST (i.e. leaving DST). The specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-of-
week fixed effects, day-of-month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level.
38
Figure 11: RDD - Within-differences estimates for each hour-group
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(A) RDD - effect by hour: treated group
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(B) RDD - effect by hour: control group
Note: This figure presents RDD estimates disaggregated by treatment and control groups by each
group of hours of the day. The specifications contain municipality fixed effects, day-of-week fixed
effects, day-of-month fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level
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Table 1: Treated states
Year Begin End Length (days) States
2006-2007 Nov 5 2006 Feb 25 2007 112 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2007-2008 Oct 14 2007 Feb 17 2008 126 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2008-2009 Oct 19 2008 Feb 15 2009 119 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2009-2010 Oct 18 2009 Feb 21 2010 126 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2010-2011 Oct 17 2010 Feb 20 2011 126 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2011-2012 Oct 16 2011 Feb 26 2012 133 BA, DF, ES, GO, MG, MS,
MT, PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2012-2013 Oct 21 2012 Feb 17 2013 119 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP, TO.
2013-2014 Oct 20 2013 Feb 16 2014 119 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2014-2015 Oct 19 2014 Feb 22 2015 126 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
2015-2016 Oct 18 2015 Feb 21 2016 126 DF, ES, GO, MG, MS, MT,
PR, RJ, RS, SC, SP.
Note: This table presents the list of the Brazilian states that adopted DST from 2006-2015. It also
reports the date of transition from standard time (ST) to DST and from DST to ST. Source: http:
//www.mme.gov.br/. State codes: BA - Bahia; DF - Distrito Federal; ES - Espírito Santo; GO - Goiás;
MG - Minas Gerais; MS - Mato Grosso do Sul; MT - Mato Grosso; PR - Paraná; RJ - Rio de Janeiro; RS
- Rio Grande do Sul; SC - Santa Catarina; SP - São Paulo; TO - Tocantins.
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates: different temporal bandwidths
around the transition date
(A) Whole day 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DST -0.0251* -0.0288** -0.0289** -0.0288** -0.0345**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES NO
Baseline mean .3067 .3061 .3003 .2933 .2933
% ∆ from baseline -8.183 -9.413 -9.618 -9.83 -11.767
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,982,528 11,982,528
(B) Hours 0/1 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DST -0.0113*** -0.0129*** -0.0093*** -0.0093*** -0.0101***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES NO
Baseline mean .0365 .0355 .0338 .0322 .0322
% ∆ from baseline -31.019 -36.223 -27.601 -28.817 -31.274
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,982,528 11,982,528
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of DST on homicide
rate per million inhabitants for different time-spans around the transition to DST. Panel (A)
Whole day presents estimates considering all hours of the day, whereas panel (B) Hours 0/1
restrict the sample to sunset hours. Row Baseline mean displays the mean of the outcome for
treated units during the pre-treatment period in question. Row % ∆ from baseline displays the
percent variation from βˆ1 with respect to the baselinemean. Specifications includemunicipality
fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, day-of-month fixed effects, year fixed effects and, when
applicable, municipal-specific linear trends. Standard errors clustered at the state level are
presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
43
Table 5: Deaths before hospital admission
(A) Whole day 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4)
DST -0.0192* -0.0188 -0.0212** -0.0227*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES
Year YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES
Baseline mean .2012 .2014 .197 .1921
% ∆ from baseline -9.557 -9.357 -10.784 -11.828
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,982,528
(B) Hours 0/1 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4)
DST -0.0091*** -0.0100*** -0.0062*** -0.0077***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES
Year YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES
Baseline mean .025 .0244 .0232 .022
% ∆ from baseline -36.401 -40.911 -26.687 -34.849
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,982,528
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of DST
on homicide rate permillion inhabitants while restricting the sample of Table 4 to
deaths that occurred before admission to a health facility. The panel (A)Whole day
presents estimates considering all hours of the day, whereas panel (B) Hours 0/1
restricts the sample to sunset hours. Row Baseline mean displays the mean of the
outcome for treated units during the pre-treatment period in question. Row% ∆
from baseline displays the percent variation from βˆ1 with respect to the baseline
mean. Specifications includemunicipality fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects,
day-of-month fixed effects, year fixed effects and, when applicable, municipal-
specific linear trends. Standard errors clustered at the state level are presented
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Table 6: Alternative outcome: death rate as consequence of injuries
inflicted by another person, by any means, with intent to injure or
kill
(A) Whole day 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4)
DST -0.0349** -0.0292** -0.0287** -0.0280*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES
Year YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES
Baseline mean .4327 .436 .4269 .4185
% ∆ from baseline -8.058 -6.698 -6.729 -6.684
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,982,528
(B) Hours 0/1 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4)
DST -0.0111*** -0.0120*** -0.0095*** -0.0106***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES
Year YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES
Baseline mean .0478 .0474 .0461 .0443
% ∆ from baseline -23.123 -25.328 -20.646 -24.008
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,982,528
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of DST
on homicide rate per million inhabitants as defined by death rate as consequence
of injuries inflicted by another person, by any means, with intent to injure or
kill. The panel (A) Whole day presents estimates considering all hours of the day,
whereas panel (B) Hours 0/1 restricts the sample to sunset hours. Row Baseline
mean displays themean of the outcome for treated units during the pre-treatment
period in question. Row % ∆ from baseline displays the percent variation from
βˆ1 with respect to the baseline mean. Specifications include municipality fixed
effects, day-of-week fixed effects, day-of-month fixed effects, year fixed effects
and,when applicable,municipal-specific linear trends. Standard errors clustered
at the state level are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5%
and p<10% respectively.
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Table 7: Difference-in-differences estimates: excluding day of tran-
sition - different temporal-bandwidths around the transition date
(A) Whole day 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4)
DST -0.0261* -0.0189 -0.0244** -0.0273*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES
Year YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES
Baseline mean .3067 .3061 .3003 .2933
% ∆ from baseline -8.521 -6.183 -8.119 -9.311
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,880,288
(B) Hours 0/1 20 days 30 days 60 days 120 days(1) (2) (3) (4)
DST -0.0136*** -0.0121*** -0.0089*** -0.0091***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-week F.E YES YES YES YES
Day-of-month F.E YES YES YES YES
Election YES YES YES YES
Carnival NO NO NO YES
Year YES YES YES YES
Municipal trend YES YES YES YES
Baseline mean .0365 .0355 .0338 .0322
% ∆ from baseline -37.375 -34.207 -26.42 -28.401
Municipalities 5112 5112 5112 5112
Observations 2,044,800 3,067,200 6,134,400 11,880,288
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of DST
on homicide rate per million inhabitants for different time-spans around the
transition to DST while excluding the day of transition. Panel (A) Whole day
presents estimates considering all hours of the day, whereas panel (B) Hours 0/1
restrict the sample to sunset hours. Row Baseline mean displays the mean of the
outcome for treated units during the pre-treatment period in question. Row% ∆
from baseline displays the percent variation from βˆ1 with respect to the baseline
mean. Specifications includemunicipality fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects,
day-of-month fixed effects, year fixed effects and, when applicable, municipal-
specific linear trends. Standard errors clustered at the state level are presented
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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A Appendix
A.1 Metadata
Death from external causes
Brazilian microdata on deaths caused by an external event were downloaded from
SUS’swebsite athttp://www.datasus.gov.br/DATASUS/index.php?area=0901&item=
1&acao=26 (Last download on September 3 2017). At the time of the last download,
hours for the daily records of death certificates were available only from 2006 to
2015, which is the period included in our analysis. To avoid discretionary editing
of the data, we abstain from recoding any entry for which the hour of death is not
recorded in the standard HH:MM format. Examples range from easily distinguish-
able cases (e.g 18H15, 19?30, 22/00) to far from obvious entries (e.g, 01-1, 0173,
01;0). Codebook for the original data can be found at ftp://ftp.datasus.gov.
br/dissemin/publicos/SIM/CID10/Docs/Estrutura_SIM_para_CD.pdf (Last down-
load on September 3 2017). A convenient application for browsing descriptions of
each ICD-10 code used in our classification can be found at http://apps.who.int/
classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en, under “XX External causes of morbidity
and mortality” (last accessed Nov 3 2017).
Sunlight hours
Sunlight hours for each location-date in the period analyzed were calculated using
the function getSunlightTimes(), of the R package suncalc version 0.4 running on
R version 3.4.3 (for more information, please refer to https://cran.r-project.org/
package=suncalc - Last accessed on December 16 2018). Sunset hour is defined as
the hour the “sun disappears below the horizon, evening civil twilight starts”. In
our regressions, the hour of death relative to sunset time is the intra-date difference
between the recorded hour of death and the sunset hour at any given municipality-
date. Non-integer relative hours of death are then rounded down. Take the example
48
of the relative sunset hour, which assumes value 0 at the exact time the sun disappears
below the horizon; any value in the interval [−1; 0) means that the death occurred
during the hour before the the sun disappears below the horizon, thus this death goes
into the hour −1. On the other hand, any value in the interval [0; 1) belongs to the
relative hour 0, which covers the hour following the disappearance of the sun below
the horizon.
Municipal characteristics
Municipal area and distances to border were calculated using official GIS data pro-
vided by the national bureau of statistics (IBGE). Those were computed over the
Brazilian 2007 municipal shapefile 55mu2500psr, which can be found at https://
downloads.ibge.gov.br/downloads_geociencias.htm#. Urban population, total
population, and GDP come from the last National Census, in 2010, also carried by
IBGE. This information is conveniently available at http://www.ipeadata.gov.br.
A.2 Tables
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics: Individual (deceasedperson)
and municipal characteristics
(A) Individual Treated Control Difference(1) (2) (3)
Black .090 .076 .014***
(.2857) (.2645) (.0011)
Age 29.462 28.687 .775***
( 11.750) (11.582) (.045)
Married .137 .122 .015***
(.3442) (.3271) (.001)
Years of education 6.119 5.022 1.098***
( 2.928) (2.988) (.013)
Observations 129,738 139,090 N = 268,828
(B) Municipality Treated Control Difference(1) (2) (3)
per capita GDP (×1,000) 16.951 6.734 10.217***
( 15.280) (8.731) (.365)
Population density 142.345 75.794 66.551***
(709.202) (368.425) 16.674
% Urban population .7084 .5583 .1501***
(.2140) (.1968) (.0058)
Population (×1,000) 40.868 31.606 9.262
(261.594) (112.950) ( 5.990)
Area Km2 (×1,000) 1.025 2.506 -1.481***
(2.439) (8.559) (166.239)
Observations 2,943 2,169 N = 5,112
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics, decomposed by treat-
ment status, on characteristics of municipalities and deceased victims.
Information on victims are available in the SIM database while municipal
characteristics were retrieved from the 2010 Brazilian census, which is the
last census available.
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Second Chapter
Educated Candidates and Efficient Bureaucrats
2.1 Introduction
Among individual characteristics that potentially play a role in politicians’ perfor-
mance in office, few have been as discussed in the literature as education attainment,
being a stylized fact in economics and political science to proxy politicians’ quality
from levels of formal schooling (see Ferraz andFinan, 2009; Brollo et al., 2013;Atkinson,
Rogers and Olfert, 2016, to mention only a few).
While there are compelling theoretical arguments for why more educated can-
didates would perform better in office across different measures, empirical studies
hardly agree on the validity of this assumption, often pointing minute observed dif-
ferences in outcomes, if any. For instance, regarding the impact of electing a more
educated leader on education outcomes itself, while cross-country exercises suggest
that educational attainment of the population is affected (Diaz-Serrano and Pérez,
2013), within-country analysis finds no difference whatsoever (Lahoti and Sahoo,
2016). Such discordance between increased welfare and no effect at all is also found
with respect to fiscal policy (Rocha, Orellano andBugarin, 2016; Freier and Thomasius,
2015), economic growth, and legislative productivity (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Carnes and Lupu, 2016).
A less touched strand on politicians’ quality, however, regards whether more edu-
cated candidates make less corrupt politicians and more efficient managers of public
resources.1 Although scarce literature exploiting similar settings has found politicians
with college degrees are not less likely to be corrupt (Carnes and Lupu, 2016), theo-
retical predictions over this outcome point to plausible opposite potential directions.
For instance, under certain conditions, greater career concern on the behalf of the
educated would imply higher risk aversion and lesser corrupt behavior (Brollo et al.,
2013). On the other hand, as a reflex of educated politicians having higher potential
gains in the private market, they may compensate wage differences through rent ex-
1 For the sake of concision, throughout the paper I use more educated candidate, educated candidate,
and college candidate interchangeably,meaning individualswith higher levels of education attainment
than a baseline group.
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traction (Caselli and Morelli, 2004). What the literature does not consider, however,
is third possibility regarding no differences in deliberate corrupt behavior, but lower
levels of ability to comply with managerial best-practices.
The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that educated candidates are more
competent as public funds managers and make into less corrupt politicians. Earlier
empirical evidence on that link would suffer from measurement error, since most
studies were based on indices that measure perceptions rather than actual politi-
cal corruption (Olken, 2009; Truex, 2011). Moreover, many have relied primarily on
cross-country analysis, where the inability to account for the full set of institutional
arrangements that determine both corruption and education hasmade results difficult
to interpret. In many cases, even within-country analysis can misleading, specially
when one does not account for the initial choice-set of competing candidates, regard-
ing simultaneously the distribution of education attainment among candidates and
electoral competitiveness, whichmay be endogenously determined (Carnes and Lupu,
2016).
To circumvent the first caveat of measuring corruption, I take advantage of out-
comes from a randomized anti-corruption carried by Controladoria Geral da União
(hereafter, CGU), which makes observation of corruption levels independent of po-
tential corruption, efficiency of local institutions, politicians’ education attainment,
voters’ preferences towards educated candidates, and other pre-existent characteris-
tics. Regarding endogenous selection of educated candidates into office, when directly
comparing groups of municipalities that elected leaders with different levels of educa-
tion, naive approaches do not take into account whether it results from voters revealed
preference, as it might be that none of the candidates in a given municipality attained
higher education. On the other hand, a municipal election in which the two most
competitive candidates have a college degree is very likely to reflect a more educated
electorate - or higher ability to attract votes being correlated with education attain-
ment. Even under the exact same proportion of educated candidates in both groups
of municipalities, a naive difference is still vulnerable to capturing different levels of
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state capacity, which may correlate both with political preferences for more educated
candidates and lower levels of pre-existing corruption.
Thus, using close-race elections regression discontinuity design (RDD) for mu-
nicipalities where the elected candidate has a college degree and the runner-up has
lesser education attainment and vice versa, Brazilian political structure lends mu-
nicipal administrations to an empirical approach in which the choice-set of elected
mayors is compatible with revealed preferences, and for which constituencies are bal-
anced across institutional settings. In a framework where mismanagement is deeply
ingrained, I find that candidates with higher formal education show no difference in
likelihood of committing irregularities, while in the intensive margin more educated
candidates commit from 8 to 11% less irregularities, a result sharply driven by a dif-
ference in the number of moderate-type infringements (from 9 to 13%). On the other
hand, no difference is found regarding formal or severe infringements.
Further results are based on a subsample of CGU inspections in which auditors
inform by how much mayors should refund the public administration for wasted or
diverted funds. Surprisingly I find no significant difference between these two types of
candidates either for having received a recommendation of refund or for the amount
claimed for refund.2 Taken together, those results suggest that this difference in
compliance is likely due to lack of knowledge on administrative protocols (in contrast
with the different levels education translating into different corrupt behavior), since
there is no monetary rent-extraction or, as I show, future electoral gains.
Nevertheless, this difference in ability to comply with public accounts and proto-
cols seems to have consequences to municipal budget in the subsequent term, which
is in line with previous literature (Brollo, 2008): reduced form estimation shows that,
regardless of reelection, mayors in the subsequent mandate where a college candi-
date was elected receive roughly 60%more discretionary transfers from higher offices
(Federal and State governments). As a last exercise, I provide regression results for
2The amount claimed for refund is based on the contracted value paid by the mayor for the goods and
services in question, the market value of those goods and services, and whether the totality of those
goods and services where delivered. Throughout the paper I use this as a proxy for the amount of
funds diverted or spent without proper substantiation
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alternative outcomes of efficiency such as administrative expenditures and relative
size of public staff, while ruling out electoral strategic behavior as drivers. College
candidates spend 7.6% less than non-college candidates with administrative functions
and inflate their temporary staff by 32.8 to 36.8% less than non-college candidates.
With no differences in reelection aspirations and reelection likelihood between college
and non-college candidates, I take these last results as further support of difference
in efficiency instead of difference in rent-extraction. In a framework of voters’ choice
this interpretation implies that citizens can validly process candidates’ education at-
tainment as a relevant signal of improved potential managerial outcomes, although
education itself comes attached to other unobservable characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a pic-
ture of Brazilian local elections and administration and of the randomized program
exploited for corruption and mismanagement measures while discussing the data
sources used. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical strategy and presents supporting
evidence to its internal validity. Finally section 2.4 presents the findings and discusses
results, while concluding remarks are presented in section 2.5.
2.2 Background and data
Local Governments and Municipal Elections
Brazilian municipalities enjoy the status of federation members, not being subordi-
nated to its State or Federal governments. This strongdecentralization lendsmunicipal
administrations, in the figure of the local executive office, to be the main actors in lo-
cal expenditures, policy implementation, and provision of basic health care, primary
education, and infrastructure. Nevertheless, Brazil’s tributary structure concentrates
taxes collection at the Federal and State levels, with municipal taxes representing
only 6% of total municipal revenue (Brollo and Troiano, 2016). Federal and State ad-
ministrations then distribute tax revenue across municipal administrations over two
mechanisms: Automatically, through mandatory constitutional transfers, or upon
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application, through discretionary transfers called convênios.
The representative of municipal administrations are themayors, head of the execu-
tive office, which are democratically elected every four years, and eligible for reelection
for one subsequent mandate. Voting is compulsory for citizens aged 18-70 and en-
forced by legal sanctions if not justified, which supports a turnout rate around 87%. In
this framework of compulsory voting, common sources of self-selection of voters such
as pro-sociality, and social pressure should play virtually no role in driving who ends
up getting elected because of specific types of voters who turnout (Hortala-Vallve and
Esteve-Volart, 2011).
Information on Brazilian municipal elections for 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 are pub-
licly provided by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), and include candidates char-
acteristics - such as education attainment, gender, political affiliation, occupation -
and electoral outcomes - such as valid votes, turnout, number of candidates com-
peting, and votes per candidate. I use the latter variable to compute the margin of
victory by which the elected candidate won over the second-place candidate (also
called runner-up candidate). Electoral outcomes for municipalities are then linked to
those for national elections, which also happen every four years, between municipal
elections. This allows me to account for political alignment between mayors and the
federal government, which is responsible for most of the transfers.
Data on local governance and additional municipal characteristics come from var-
ious sources. Detailed information on municipal finances are made publicly available
by the Treasury Secretariat (FINBRA). It includes revenues and spending disaggre-
gated by topic, allowing the construction of relevant municipal budget variables such
as transfers received from higher offices and administrative expenditures. The Brazil-
ian Municipalities Profile Survey, conducted by the National Bureau of Geography
and Statistics (IBGE), provides information on the size and composition of the local
government, and on the presence of relevant infrastructure such as radio and tv broad-
casters, and the existence of higher education institutions in themunicipality, whereas
demographic characteristics are retrieved from 2000-2010 national census (IBGE).
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Randomized Anti-Corruption Program
In response to the lack of state capacity to detect malfeasance and the systemic cor-
ruption that became evident following the transition to democracy,3 the federal gov-
ernment created in 2003 the Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), a ministry that
centralizes the government’s internal control and sets directives for promotion of effi-
cient use of public resources. In that same year CGU launched a program consisting of
random audits of municipalities for their proper use of federal transfers, which repre-
sent a fundamental component of municipal budgets to support the public provision
of basic services and goods.
In each round of the program, which has audited more than 2,000 municipalities
with over R$22 billion worth of federal funds, municipalities are randomly chosen for
inspection through publicly held lotteries. Once municipalities and inspection topics
are drafted, CGU sends a team of auditors to cross-check accounts and documents,
inspect the delivery of public services, and verify the existence and quality of infras-
tructure to which the federal transfers were intended (Avis, Ferraz and Finan, 2017).
Shortly after the information from field inspections are reported to the central office,
detailed reports with the results for each inspectedmunicipality are published on-line
and sent to the competent authorities, including federal courts and the local judiciary,
with visible repercussion in the media and to federal, state, and local authorities (refer
to Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Litschig and Zamboni, 2016; Avis, Ferraz and Finan,
2017; Muço, 2017, for specific examples).4.
From 2006, on the 20th round of the program, the audit reports started to be
compiled internally by CGU into readable data containing the dates of the lotteries
and report release, the area to which the fund should have been invested, the federal
government program to which the transfer was attached, the amount transferred, and
the quantity of irregularities found, classified as formal/procedural, moderate, or
3Brazil experienced a military regime from April 1 1964 to March 15 1985, returning to full democracy
three years later with the passing of the 1988 Constitution.
4 Reports can be accessed and downloaded through CGU’s website, under Fiscalização em Entes Federa-
tivos - Municípios > Fiscalização Sorteio de Municípios (Retrieved on July 11, 2017)
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severe, according to degree of materiality and compromise to the program, based on
CGU’s internal normative. In this analysis, I focus on irregularities committed during
the 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 electoral terms. Hence, the main estimation sample
consists of all audits conducted from March 2006.5
Defining “Educated” candidates
The definition of “educated” in the literature has been synonymous of having a college
degree especially because most electoral data do not provide years of schooling but
education level (e.g., primary school, high school, and college). I opt for defining
an educated candidate as a candidate having at least a college degree for two main
reasons. First, the recent political debate in Brazil regarded the possibility of requiring
candidates to have a college degree in order to be eligible.6. Second, almost half of
the candidates over the electoral universe have a college degree, making this group a
favorable counterpart. Additionally, this definition is a standard in the literature in the
absence of a non-categorical variable such as years of schooling. Thus, in the present
exercise being an educated candidate means having at least a college degree, to which
I refer as college candidate, in contrast with having a lesser education attainment, to
which I refer as non-college candidate. To enforce allmunicipalities in the sample have
the same choice-set regarding candidates’ education, the sample is restricted to elec-
tions for which (1stplacecolle ge1; 2ndplacecolle ge0) or (1stplacecolle ge0; 2ndplacecolle ge1), to
which I refer as college-races.
Then, the last data-processing step regards defining the treatment assignment
mechanism. The key feature of any RD design, discussed in details in section 2.3, is
the presence of a running variable with a known threshold that determines treatment
5 The analysis would be compromised in case characteristics correlated with mayors’ education at-
tainment are also correlated with how throughly CGU auditors investigate and report irregularities.
Nevertheless, CGU is seemed as one of the government’s most autonomous and least politicized agen-
cies. Regarding concerns that CGU auditors may themselves be corrupt, previous works failed to find
any evidence that the auditors manipulate their reports (Hidalgo, Canello and Lima-de Oliveira, 2016;
Bersch, Praça and Taylor, 2017).
6TheConstitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) n.119/2015 proposes that candidates to legislative and
executive offices should have at least a college degree in order to be eligible. This PEC was deemed
admissible onMay 12 2016 by the congress Commission for Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship, and
waits for further appreciation before being voted.
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assignment for each unit in the sample. In the present case, which exploits a sharp
change in the probability of being treated, units with a value of the running variable
greater than or equal to the threshold receive the treatment, which is electing a college
mayor, whereas units with a value of the running variable lesser than the threshold
do not receive the treatment, which means electing a non-college mayor. In the case of
close-race elections, this running variable is the margin of victory (MV) by which the
elected candidate won over the runner-up, and the threshold that divides treatment
and control groups is MV  0: To ensure that all non-college candidates are on one
side of the cutoff (left side) and all college candidates are on the other (right side),MV
is transformed following the scheme below.
MV 

vote sharecolle ge1 − vote sharecolle ge0, if 1stplacecolle ge1
(vote sharecolle ge0 − vote sharecolle ge1) × (−1), if 1stplacecolle ge0
Descriptive statistics
Thefinal sample of auditedmunicipalities forwhich the elected candidate hasdifferent
education attainment from the runner-up, with one of them having at least a college
degree, is shown in figure 1. Municipalities where a college candidate was elected are
represented by blue diamonds whereas those where a non-college candidate won are
represented by red circles. It is fair to say that there is no meaningful discrepancy in
the geographic distribution of those two groups across the country.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The composition of this non-college group is explicit in figure 2. The upper panel
shows the educationdistribution for all elected candidates (top left) and all non-elected
candidates (top right) over the 2005-2008 and 2009-2012 electoral terms. The lower
panel shows the educationdistribution for elected candidates (bottom left) and runner-
up candidates (bottom right) only over college-races, suggesting that the final sample
is not abnormally different from the electoral universe in terms of the distribution of
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education among candidates.
[Figure 2 about here.]
For the overall final sample as well as disaggregated by treatment status, table
1 presents descriptive statistics over the considered variables, which are divided in
four panels: (A) Audits and (B) Bureaucracy, comprising the main outcomes, and (C)
Elections and (D) Municipality, comprising the covariates used to provide illustration
of the balance between treatment and control groups.
Although most variables are self explanatory, some need further consideration.
For instance, in the panel (A), which lists the variables retrieved from CGU’s dataset,
Health, Education, and Social assistance programare indicator variables equal to one if
the funds audited were intended to Health, Education, or Social assistance. Programs
involving other areas such as transportation and agriculture do exist, however, they are
not present through all rounds of inspection or all municipalities. This way, I focus on
Health, Education, and Social assistance, which account for 73.28% of issues audited
(also referred to as inspection orders), 78% of inspected funds, and concentrate 80.65%
of all irregularities found by the program.
[Table 1 about here.]
In panel (B), besides municipal expenses, two other outcomes are # Public servants
pc, the per-capita number of administrative employees working directly to the exec-
utive office, and # Commissioned pc, the per-capita number of temporary (mandate-
dependent) positions directly appointed by the mayor without clear predefined cri-
teria or requirements for both admission and dismissal. In contrast with tenured or
permanent employees, who must pass a civil service entrance exam and cannot be
easily dismissed by the mayor due to de jure job stability, temporary positions (cargos
comissionados) may proxy engagement in political patronage to gain reelection, since it
ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of the politician in charge
(Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Colonnelli, Teso and Prem, 2018). Those variables, jointly
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with data on reelection success, are used to provide insights on rent-extraction versus
difference-in-efficiency hypotheses.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Education attainment is strongly correlated with social and family background plus a
number of other individual-specific characteristics, which may include organizational
skills, diligence, social preferences, etc. Thus, even under randomized assignment
of mayors with different levels of education, it would not be feasible to estimate the
effect of leaders’ education itself on governance and policy outcomes.7 It follows that
providing relevant insights on whether more educated candidates perform better
in office is equivalent to testing the validity of education attainment as a predictor of
bureaucratic efficiency instead of its immediate cause. In a framework of voter’s choice
this interpretation still implies that citizens can validly process candidates’ education
attainment as a relevant signal of improved potential managerial outcomes, although
education itself comes attached to other unobservable characteristics.8
Nevertheless, even though we recognize the endogenous nature of individuals’
education attainment, simply estimating the difference in governance outcomes for
the two groups would face several shortcomings. For instance, even under the exactly
same proportion of educated candidates in both groups of municipalities, a naive
difference still faces the possibility of capturing different levels of state capacity and
welfare correlated with political selection of less corrupt candidates that happen to
be more educated. Along the same lines, a naive difference may inflate results by
capturing the effect of differences in political competition, and therefore post-election
oversight, in case less educated candidates are elected in less competitive elections.
In the absence of tools able to account for the full set of social and institutional
7Although that procedure would eliminate endogenous political and electoral selection into office, it
would not eliminate individuals’ endogenous selection into different levels of formal education, which
is a function of several other individual-specific features that may affect the way mayors manage
municipalities.
8This is specially important in a framework of voters’ rational choice based on policy positions and
non-policy information where parties and platforms are highly volatile.
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arrangements that determine both pre-treatment characteristics and observed out-
comes, I rely on close elections regression discontinuity design to compare levels of
non-compliance in the use of public funds between municipalities in which a more
educated candidate barely won the election against a less educated runner-up (treat-
ment group) to those where a less educated candidate barely won an election against
a more educated runner-up (control group). Analytically, the difference in outcomes
between municipalities that could have elected a non-college candidate but ended up
barely electing a college candidate by a small advantage on the ballots and vice versa
can be expressed as τ  limMV↓0 E[Y |MV] − limMV↑0 E[Y |MV], where Y is the level
of outcome in question and MV is the margin by which the first placed candidate
outperformed its runner-up, as each function approach an infinitesimal advantage to-
wards zero. Since we don’t know the true form of E[Y |MV], the estimated parameter
of interest takes the form τˆ  αˆ1 − αˆ0, where αˆ1 and αˆ0 are the intercepts as MV → 0
on each side of the cutoff, obtained from the solution of the minimization problem in
equation (1).

αˆ0
βˆ0
αˆ1
βˆ1
γ

 arg min
α0 ,β0 ,α1 ,β1 ,γ
∑
{Yi − 1(MVi < 0)(α0 + β0MVi)
−1(MVi > 0)(α1 + β1MVi) −Z iγ}2Ktri (MVi)(1)
InwhichZ i is a vector of balanced covariates aimed to improve efficiency (Calonico
et al., 2017) and Ktri (MVi) is the triangular kernel function of MV , which serves to to
localize the regression fit near the cutoff by attributing greater weight to observations
the closer they are to MV  0.
Nevertheless, although RDD imposes less restrictive requirements for identifica-
tion than other observational tools, its internal validity is based on the assumption
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of continuity of potential outcome in the absence of treatment. Given the exclusive
nature of counterfactual analysis, however, this assumption is not directly testable.
In turn, standard practice involves providing results for two empirical exercises as
follows.
To rule out endogenous electoral selection into treatment, which could be caused,
for instance, by voters’ strong preferences for college candidates or by higher ability
to attract votes being correlated with education attainment, a standard practice is to
show the absence of a density discontinuity around the cutoff. The underlying as-
sumption here is that, if having at least a college degree does not predict the margin
of victory of college candidates, then the number of treated observations just above
the cutoff should be similar to the number of control observations below it. Therefore,
in table 2 I provide nonparametric estimates to test the density continuity around the
cutoff, which are computed based on local polynomial techniques recently proposed
by Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2017). As required, the tests do not suggest any signif-
icant difference in density across MV  0. Additionally, the widely used MCcrary’s
discontinuity test, which estimates the log difference in height of the empirical density
distributions around the threshold, is not significant as well – -.036 (.166).
[Table 2 about here.]
To reinforce the evidence suggested by the aforementioned tests, as well as to rule
out that endogenous institutional characteristics are the actual drivers of the estimated
effect, the second standard practice is to show that relevant baseline characteristics
are not discontinuous around the cutoff. Although this does not imply that the
potential outcomewould be continuous around the cutoff in the absence of treatment,
discontinuity in pretreatment covariates relevant for the outcome of interest may
suggest that institutional arrangements are pushing the types of would-be barely-
losers up above the threshold or moving potential barely-winners down below the
threshold. For instance, a non-college candidate that runs in close election against
a college candidate and wins may be better-off in other dimensions such as political
alignment with higher offices, incumbency, or support from client voters that benefit
63
fromhis party holding office. Therefore, in figure 3 I provide estimateddiscontinuities,
along with conservative 90% level confidence intervals, over baseline characteristics,
which are estimated in the same fashion of equation 1 except for the absence of
controls, following de la Cuesta and Imai (2016). It is clear that every considered
baseline variables related to the inspection program itself, government characteristics
in the beginning of themandate, municipal features, andmost electoral characteristics
are balanced.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Moreover, the borderline differences are solely driven by individual-specific fea-
tures: Having previous political experience as an executive or legislative elected offi-
cial, being a female, and being affiliated to PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party).
As education attainment is a function of individual tastes and restrictions, which are
naturally expected to be correlated with other individual self-selected characteristics,
the only consequence of such imbalance is that one cannot interpret the coefficient τ
as the effect of education itself, as already acknowledged. Since the goal in this paper
is testing the validity of education attainment as a signal of bureaucratic efficiency
instead of its immediate cause, this minimal imbalance in terms of point estimates can
be seen as a direct imbalance at the candidate level instead of in institutional variables
able to affect both selection into treatment and potential corruption levels. Neverthe-
less, given the relationship between political experience, gender, and efficiency (Brollo
and Troiano, 2016; Coviello and Gagliarducci, 2017), I provide results over restricted
samples to show the effect is not driven by each of these characteristics.9
9Despite widely spread misconception regarding the necessary conditions for RD design to provide
internally-valid treatment estimates, the presence of randomized characteristics is not necessary -
although it would be sufficient. In fact, even if there is imbalance in pretreatment covariates just below
and above the threshold it does not necessarily imply the violation of the identification assumption for
the RD design as long as there is no discontinuous jump at the threshold (Snyder, Folke and Hirano,
2015; de la Cuesta and Imai, 2016).
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2.4 Results
Figure 4 displays the main findings graphically for the log number of irregularities
per issues audited in college-races: non-college candidates that won over college
candidates to the left of MV  0 and college candidates that won over non-college
candidates to the right ofMV  0. In the top panel we see great dispersion in the level
of procedural irregularities found, with no clear difference between the two groups,
whereas forModerate charges there is a clear and highly significant difference between
the two groups at the cutoff. In the bottom panel are displayed analogous graphs for
Severe and Total charges, the latter being the sum of Formal, Moderate and Severe.
Jointly, we see that the difference in Total charges is driven by Moderate charges.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Regression results for the logarithm of charges per issue audited as the dependent
variable are presented in table 3, preceded by estimates of the likelihood of having
committed at least one of each type of infringement. Results for the dummy variables,
although not significant point a trend of college candidates being less likely to commit
formal or moderate infringements, but more likely to commit severe ones or any
infringement at all, although for the latter point estimates are fairly close to zero. For
the logarithm of charges, results agree between linear (top panel) e quadratic (bottom
panel) specifications, pointing that college-educated candidates commit 9.7-13.1% less
moderate infractions, which drives a reduction by 8-11% in total charges.10, 11
[Table 3 about here.]
10In exercises not reported but available upon request I estimate the same regressions restricted to nar-
rower pre-selected intervals of MV following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), which imposes
windows sized from MV  [−0.07, 0.07]. The reduction sometimes by 50% in sample size (from 520
to 253 observations), however, gives point estimates that are not statistically significant, but suggest
the same pattern as those obtained through an unrestricted range of MV . For instance, estimates for
ln(#Moderate) and ln(#Total) are respectively -0.168 (0.126) and -0.092 (0.120) using local linear regres-
sion. Moreover, sample size for other outcomes analyzed later make local techniques unfeasible. That
said, I refrain from using local estimation and rely on the full sample while applying the triangular
kernel function on MV
11Table A1 presents results for infringements per issue audited in level instead of in logarithmic trans-
formation. In general, results are in accordance with table 3.
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Given the borderline imbalance in political experience, gender, and being affiliated
to PSDB (although p-value> 0.10), previously shown in figure 3, and the relation-
ship between those variables and managerial outcomes found by previous literature
(Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Coviello and Gagliarducci, 2017), I provide results in table
4 over restricted samples to show the effect is not driven by these individual-specific
characteristics correlated with being a college candidate. Although there is no sug-
gestion of imbalance in candidates facing different likelihood of being on their second
subsequent mandate (i.e., facing a term limit), the first panel also presents results for a
sample restricted to first-termmayors, following Ferraz and Finan (2011), who pointed
that due to decreased electoral concerns second-termmayors tend to extract increased
levels of rent.12
[Table 4 about here.]
Regarding the intensive margin of mismanagement, results in table 4 generally
follow the same pattern exhibited by overall regressions in table 3, with college can-
didates committing less total infractions mainly through reduced levels of moderate
infractions by 9.3-12.5%. Moreover, in exercises not reported but available upon re-
quest I estimate the same regressions restricting the samples according to pairwise
combinations of the restrictions in table 4, as well as for all characteristics combined,
for which results exhibit a similar pattern. Regarding that latter combination, no
significant difference is found with respect to the dummies whereas estimates for
ln(#Formal), ln(#Moderate), ln(#Severe), and ln(#Total) are, respectively: .023 (.043);
-.226*** (.086); .014 (.075); -.142* (.082). Jointly those results suggest this rather small
imbalance at the candidate level, which is likely to stem from a greater process of self-
selection that also involves education attainment, is not driving the predictive power
of candidates’ education over proper use of public resources.
An immediate question that follows regards the difference in the amount of public
funds wasted as consequence of the different levels of irregularities found. In trying
12In fact, restricting the sample to each of these characteristics may even increase imbalance in other
correlated dimensions. For each of these restricted samples, however, I obtain estimates in the fashion
of Figure 3 to learn that no further imbalance was created. Results are available upon request.
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to translate these differences in efficiency into monetary costs, previous studies relied
on the ratio of the transfer in which an irregularity was found divided by the total
audited amount of transfers. Nevertheless, the numerator of this ratio is defined as the
whole amount transfered to that municipality by the given program in contrast to the
amount corrupted relative to the total amount transferred. For instance, even if two
municipalities receive the same number of funds with each fund of the same amount,
a municipality that engages in 25% over-invoice above market value when acquiring
inputs would be pointed as inefficient as one that engages in 400% over-invoice based
on the same budget. This fraction thus is not informative regarding the amount of
money wasted.
Nevertheless, in an effort to enforce provision and quality of school meals in public
schools, from lotteries 34 to 40 CGU not only inspected municipalities and reported
irregularities, but also provided specific recommendations on the infringements in-
volving funds of the National Program for School Feeding (Programa Nacional de
Alimentação Escolar, hereafter PNAE). These sub-sample comprised 371 municipal-
ities (6.67% of Brazilian municipalities), over 1,797 schools across the 26 states. The
final PNAE audit findings reported howmuch with respect to the total PNAE transfer
the mayor should return to public budget to compensate for the amount he or she
wasted. Based on this dossier I can construct a relative measure of monetary waste
compatible with malfeasance.13
[Table 5 about here.]
In table 5 I present regression results for which the dependent variable is dummy
that indicates whether that mayor received any recommendation for refunding the
program (columns 1 and 2) and for which the dependent variable is the ratio of the
amount pointed by CGU auditors for refund divided by the original amount of the
PNAE fund (columns 3 and 4). Parametric and non-parametric estimations show
minute and not significant difference in recommendations by CGU, especially for the
13This report is available at CGU’s website under Relatório de Avaliação da Execução de Programas de
Governo Nº 63 - Apoio à Alimentação Escolar na Educação Básica. Refer to pages 75-92 for tabulated
data. (Last accessed on October 26, 2017).
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relative amount of funds diverted or spent without proper substantiation. Since both
candidate-groups have the same propensity of being audited for the use of Education
funds, as seen in figure 3 and verification regressions over irregularities restricted
to Education funds show a similar pattern as that observed across table 3, differ-
ence in strategic corruption between college and non-college candidates regarding
the nature of the program should not be a concern. Jointly, these results are in line
with considerations previously made by CGU, suggesting that a considerable share of
non-compliance (here, the levels of irregularities found) is likely due to lack of proper
public-administration knowledge - in contrastwith the less educationmore corruption
hypothesis.14
This difference in ability to comply with public accounts and protocols, however,
has consequences to municipal budget in the subsequent term. In line with previous
literature, which points that the Federal government suspends discretionary funds
to municipalities where irregularities were found (Brollo, 2008), a reduced form es-
timation shown in table 6 point that, regardless of reelection cases, mayors in the
subsequent mandate where a college candidate was elected receive at least 60% more
discretionary transfers from higher offices (Federal and State governments).
[Table 6 about here.]
Column 1 of table 6 represents overall discretionary inter-government transfers
in the current mandate, called convênios, the ones received upon application and
appreciation by the higher office, while columns 2 and 3 disaggregate the convênios
into the amount transfered by the federal government and that by state governments
during the current mandate. Columns 4-6 display results for variables following the
same definition, but computed for the subsequent mandate, i.e. the next mandate
14CGU’s website: “...In many cases the problem is caused by lack of knowledge and unpreparedness
by the public manager, and not by bad-faith or misconduct”, under the sub-heading Irregularidades;
CGU’s website: “...lack of knowledge is another issue that must be resolved. ‘The audit courts are
composed of highly-qualified staff that are recruited and trained to overlook public management.
On the other side, public managers are not always qualified and at the same knowledge level for
the activity she or he is going to perform’.”; G1 News: “ Lack of knowledge is the main cause for
irregularities committed by mayors in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, according to the according to
Controladoria-Geral da União’s (CGU) superintendent, José Paulo Barbieri.” (Retrieved on October
17, 2017).
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after a college degree candidate was elected. Results for the current mandate suggest,
although not significant, that college candidates have, on average, greater success in
receiving discretionary transfers from both higher offices. This, however, would not
be enough for the significant difference in success found for the subsequent mandate,
in accordance with previous literature on the effect of irregularities and malfeasance
disclosure.
As a last exercise, I provide regression results for alternative outcomes of efficiency
in table 7. Column 1 displays results for ln of administrative expenditures over total
municipal budget as the dependent variable. It suggests that college candidates spend
7.6% less than non-college candidates with administrative activities necessary for the
functioning of the municipal executive. This cost is partially driven by a 3.3% lower
variation inmunicipal staff between the first the last years of administration. Although
increase in the size of government in either nominal or real terms cannot be seen a
priori as a negative measure of efficiency in public administration (Besley, 2006), I
recall that both college and non-college administrations start their mandates with the
same average size of staff, as seen in figure 3.
Moreover, for the overall sample and across most subsamples the difference in
inflation of temporary staff directly appointed by the mayor between the first and last
years of mandate, cargos comissionados, range from -32.8 to -36.8%. Commissioned
positions, however, can be thought as a proxy for engagement in political patronage to
gain reelection, since it ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of
the politician who provided the position (Brollo and Troiano, 2016). Nevertheless, in
contrast with the clientelism hypothesis, the last two columns of table 7 rule out strate-
gic behavior regarding electoral prospects, with nodifferences in reelection aspirations
and reelection likelihood between college and non-college candidates. Taken together,
this backs our difference-in-efficiency hypothesis instead of the rent-extraction one.
[Table 7 about here.]
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
Among municipalities balanced across institutional features, I show that in the ex-
tensive margin more educated candidates are as likely as others to commit an irregu-
larity. The intensive margin however shows a different picture, with more educated
candidates committing from 8 to 11% less irregularities, which is driven by a sharp
difference in moderate infringements whereas no difference is found regarding for-
mal and severe ones. However, since estimations show no difference in the amount of
funds diverted or spent without proper substantiation, results may be interpreted as
being in line with conclusions derived by the institution that undertakes the auditing
program - but regardless of education - that a substantial share of irregularities is
caused by lack of administrative knowledge. This difference in ability to comply with
public accounts and protocols, however, has consequences to municipal budget in the
subsequent term, pointing that mayors in the subsequent mandate where a college
candidate was elected receive substantially more discretionary transfers from higher
offices. Whether similar findings extend to the context of developed countries is left
as an open question. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the empirical strategy ap-
plied in this paper could be applied in other countries that already count with similar
auditing programs.
Across other dimensions, previous literature has not agreed on the governance
effects of electing officials with different education levels. Joint with the results pre-
sented in this paper, which do not seem to point in the direction that college is asso-
ciated with less corruption, but instead increased efficiency, it is likely that provision
of training such as by CGU’s own Program for Strengthening of Public Management
(Programa de Fortalecimento da Gestão Pública), which offers public servants and
elected officials training on public management good practices, may promote effi-
ciency without any loss of representativity. Unfortunately, given the self-selection
into this program, it is not feasible to provide hard evidence in that direction. More-
over, those results should be taken with caution, as implementing a policy to restrict
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candidacy according to education attainment would result in a different general equi-
librium of self-selection into politics and electoral selection, which, in the presence of
barriers to the acquisition of education, may have undesirable consequences such as
the undefined continuation of political dynasties.
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Figure 1: Final sample - college vs non-college elected mayors
Note: This figure displays the geographic distribution of each municipality in the final sample
that elected, in a “college-race”, either a college candidate (blue diamonds) or non-college
candidate (red circles). Superposedbluediamonds and red circles imply the samemunicipality
enters the final sample for both mandates, 2005-2008 and 2009-2012.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Irregularities, Elections, andMunicipal char-
acteristics
Variables Overall college=0 college=1
mean sd mean sd mean sd
(A) Audits (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any formal charge 0.567 (0.496) 0.589 (0.493) 0.545 (0.499)
Any moderate charge 0.943 (0.233) 0.962 (0.191) 0.922 (0.268)
Any severe charge 0.642 (0.480) 0.642 (0.480) 0.642 (0.480)
Any charge 0.964 (0.187) 0.974 (0.161) 0.953 (0.211)
Number of formal charges 2.193 (3.424) 2.355 (3.503) 2.027 (3.339)
Number of moderate charges 33.23 (27.41) 36.16 (28.72) 30.21 (25.71)
Number of severe charges 5.736 (9.202) 6.249 (9.782) 5.206 (8.549)
Total number of charges 41.16 (33.77) 44.76 (35.56) 37.44 (31.45)
Health program 0.716 (0.451) 0.725 (0.448) 0.708 (0.455)
Education program 0.939 (0.240) 0.943 (0.232) 0.934 (0.249)
Social assistance program 0.797 (0.403) 0.815 (0.389) 0.778 (0.416)
# Issues audited 12.16 (7.462) 12.76 (7.583) 11.55 (7.300)
ln Funds audited 14.29 (2.901) 14.24 (3.145) 14.34 (2.632)
(B) Bureaucracy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Expenses/Budget) 4.582 (0.077) 4.578 (0.097) 4.586 (0.047)
ln(Adm expences/Budget) 2.708 (0.376) 2.740 (0.369) 2.676 (0.381)
# Public servants pc 0.043 (0.018) 0.043 (0.017) 0.044 (0.019 )
# Commissioned pc 0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.005)
(C) Elections (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MV 0.003 (0.196) 0.148 (0.129) 0.148 (0.127)
Term limit 0.351 (0.478) 0.343 (0.476) 0.358 (0.480)
Experienced politician 0.172 (0.378) 0.174 (0.379) 0.171 (0.377)
Female 0.078 (0.269) 0.06 (0.239) 0.097 (0.297)
# Candidates 2.774 (0.916) 2.823 (0.943) 2.724 (0.887)
Turnout 0.877 (0.057) 0.875 (0.056) 0.878 (0.057)
Alignment - President 0.132 (0.339) 0.121 (0.326) 0.144 (0.352)
Term 2005 0.544 (0.499) 0.558 (0.498) 0.529 (0.500)
PMDB 0.180 (0.385) 0.170 (0.376) 0.191 (0.394)
PP 0.125 (0.330) 0.098 (0.298) 0.152 (0.359)
PSDB 0.117 (0.322) 0.106 (0.308) 0.128 (0.335)
PFL 0.078 (0.269) 0.098 (0.298) 0.058 (0.235)
PTB 0.075 (0.263) 0.079 (0.271) 0.070 (0.256)
PDT 0.067 (0.250) 0.094 (0.293) 0.039 (0.194)
PT 0.065 (0.247) 0.053 (0.224) 0.078 (0.268)
(D) Municipality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population 21,439 (33,778) 22,870 (38,159) 19,964 (28,567)
ln per capita GDP 8.614 (0.759) 8.645 (0.799) 8.582 (0.714)
Illiteracy rate 0.230 (0.123) 0.230 (0.126) 0.231 (0.120)
Km to state capital 248.5 (163.8) 252.2 (174.1) 244.6 (152.8)
1 ≤ AM radio broadcaster 0.203 (0.403) 0.204 (0.404) 0.202 (0.403)
1 ≤ Television broad. 0.113 (0.317) 0.121 (0.326) 0.105 (0.307)
1 ≤ Internet provider 0.515 (0.500) 0.513 (0.501) 0.518 (0.501)
1 ≤ college 0.341 (0.474) 0.370 (0.484) 0.311 (0.464)
Judicial seat 0.519 (0.500) 0.558 (0.498) 0.479 (0.501)
Observations 520 264 256
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Table 2: Manipulation Test using local density estimation
Method Unrestricted Restricted
T p-value T p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conventional 0.044 0.965 0.087 0.931
Undersmoothed 0.559 0.576 0.805 0.421
Robust Bias-Corrected 0.239 0.811 0.017 0.987
Bandwidth (hl ; hr) 0.178 0.192 0.153 0.153
Effective N (Nl ; Nr) 185 189 168 159
Note: This table presents nonparametric density continuity esti-
mates around the cutoff, based on local polynomial techniques, as
proposed in Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2017). All models used tri-
angular kernel. Inference based on Jackknife VCE for “Unrestricted”,
and Plugin VCE for “Restricted”.
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Table 5: PNAE recommendations: misuse and proportion of misused funds
Dummy Share
Non-parametric Parametric Non-parametric Parametric
(1) (2) (3) (4)
College 0.022 0.018 0.003 0.016
(0.094) (0.104) (0.023) (0.028)
MV - -0.248 - 0.107
(0.417) (0.143)
MV × college - -0.115 - 0.043
(0.472) (0.148)
Nl 63 63 63 63
Nr 67 67 67 67
Observations 130 130 130 130
Note: This table reports the effect of electing a mayor with college degree on the relative
amount of funds misused based on the PNAE recommendation report, which comprises
lotteries 34-40. The dependent variable is the surplus amount pointed by CGU auditors
that exceeded market-value expenses or for which there was no documentation attesting the
correct use of the fund. Standard errors clustered by inspection round in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Table 6: Reduced form effect of electing a college mayor in term t on
future Inter-government transfers in t + 1.
Current election-mandate Subsequent election-mandate
Overall Federal State Overall Federal State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimate 0.093 0.030 0.027 0.666*** 0.895*** 0.596**
- (0.231) (0.283) (0.235) (0.218) (0.282) (0.237)
Nl 180 180 180 180 180 180
Nr 163 163 163 163 163 163
Obs 343 343 343 343 343 343
Note: This table reports the effect of electing a mayor with college degree on receiv-
ing transfers from federal government and from state government. The dependent
variables are the ln of the given transfer category per capita. Columns 1-4 refer to
transfers received during the current election-mandate (i.e. the audited mandate),
while columns 5-8 refer to the following mandate. Overall Intergov stands for the
total amount of intergovernmental transfers received during the mandate, while the
other outcomes restricts the dependent variable only to discretionary transfers. Each
regression controls for lottery fixed effects, area-of-fund fixed effects, CGU’s popula-
tion category, interaction of electedmayor education attainment and runner-up, party
fixed effects, and municipal characteristics. Standard errors clustered by inspection
round in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Table 7: Alternative measures: Administrative expenses, ∆% Tenured public
staff, ∆% Temporary staff, and Reelection prospects
(A) Overall Administrative ∆%Tenured ∆%Temporary Rerun Reelected(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimate -0.076*** -0.033* -0.368* -0.015 0.013
- (0.027) (0.019) (0.199) (0.063) (0.056)
Nl 262 264 261 264 264
Nr 256 255 250 256 256
Obs 518 519 511 520 520
(B) First term Administrative ∆%Tenured ∆%Temporary Rerun Reelected(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimate -0.048 -0.018 -0.389* 0.001 0.020
- (0.032) (0.024) (0.232) (0.080) (0.084)
Nl 173 173 171 173 173
Nr 165 164 160 165 165
Obs 338 337 331 338 338
(C) No prev. exp. Administrative ∆%Tenured ∆%Temporary Rerun Reelected(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimate -0.080*** -0.017 -0.403* -0.035 0.005
- (0.022) (0.030) (0.216) (0.057) (0.073)
Nl 217 218 215 218 218
Nr 212 211 206 212 212
Obs 429 429 421 430 430
(D) Males Administrative ∆%Tenured ∆%Temporary Rerun Reelected(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimate -0.083** -0.038** -0.328* -0.046 -0.001
- (0.040) (0.018) (0.174) (0.074) (0.058)
Nl 246 248 245 248 248
Nr 231 230 225 231 231
Obs 477 478 470 479 479
(E) PSDB=0 Administrative ∆%Tenured ∆%Temporary Rerun Reelected(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimate -0.053 -0.001 -0.200 -0.044 0.005
- (0.038) (0.016) (0.155) (0.092) (0.067)
Nl 234 236 234 236 236
Nr 223 222 218 223 223
Obs 457 458 452 459 459
Note: This table reports the effect of electing a mayor with college degree on the ln of Admin-
istrative expenses as a share of total municipal expenses, % Variation of tenured administrative
staff between the first year and last year of the mandate, and % Variation of temporary staff
(cargos comissionados) between the first year and last year of the mandate, along with results
on the likelihood to rerun in the subsequent municipal election and to get reelected. Each re-
gression controls for term fixed effects, population, interaction ofmayor’s education attainment
and runner-up’s, party fixed effects, and municipal characteristics. Standard errors clustered
by term in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Table A1: Level - number of irregularities per issue au-
dited
(A) Linear Formal Moderate Severe Total(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate -0.0102 -0.4089*** 0.0280 -0.3911**
(0.026) (0.153) (0.069) (0.174)
Baseline mean 0.2047 2.594 0.4513 3.25
Nl 264 264 264 264
Nr 256 256 256 256
Obs 520 520 520 520
(B) Quadratic Formal Moderate Severe Total(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate 0.0217 -0.5376*** 0.0344 -0.4815**
(0.042) (0.200) (0.098) (0.229)
Baseline 0.2047 2.594 0.4513 3.25
Nl 264 264 264 264
Nr 256 256 256 256
Obs 520 520 520 520
Note: This table reports the effect of electing a mayor with college
degree on outcomes of mismanagement of public funds. The de-
pendent variable in columns 1-4 is the number of irregularities in a
given severity-category per issue audited (service order). Standard
errors clustered by inspection round in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Third Chapter
Accountability Shock and Market for
Oversight
3.1 Introduction
In public governance, transparency is arguably themost important feature in spurring
lastingaccountability, therefore inducing sustainablepro-social behaviorwithinpublic
institutions (Khemani et al., 2016). It is claimed that the main reason for such is that
citizens are inherently motivated-agents, who benefit from public goods and services
that would otherwise be compromised by extraction of political rents - or simply by
inefficient management. Although this reasoning sounds obvious, the circumstances
under which this mechanism holds are not: The literature doesn’t fall short on cases
in which citizens simply don’t react or even refrain from political engagement after
being exposed to new information (for instance, see Chong et al., 2015).
In this paper I test whether an exogenous top-down shock in oversight and political
accountability can strengthen the market for transparency in public management,
focusing on non-electoral mechanisms, such as citizens’ demand for information,
civil complaints and denouncements, and legal accountability. As the source of this
accountability saliency, I take advantage of a Federal anti-corruptionprogram inBrazil,
which selects municipalities through publicly held lotteries for inspection of proper
use of federal transfers and then discloses the findings to the general public, which has
already been shown to have media repercussion (both data evidence and anecdotal
examples on media coverage of the released reports appear in Ferraz and Finan, 2008,
2011; Litschig and Zamboni, 2016; Muço, 2017, just to cite a few).
Objectively, I analyze three blocks of outcomes in a panel-data fashion. The first
comprises measures of citizens’ engagement asmeasured by: demand for information
on public management through official requests, based on the Federal Law of Infor-
mation Access, and citizens’ interactions with the Federal ombudsman for complaints
and denouncements regarding public management. It is crucial that both aforemen-
tionedmeasures are not susceptible to strategic behavior bymunicipal administration,
as I discuss in section 3.3. The second block regards outcomes of the judicial system,
which includes the number of lawsuits filled against public agents, including lawsuits
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filled by common citizens. At last, I analyze measures of local governments’ supply
of transparency and institutional demand for oversight, which consider the likeli-
hood of municipalities adopting a local ombudsman and partnering with the federal
government to implement best practices in public transparency.
Results show that disclosure of information on the local use of public funds, on
average, increases citizens’ demand for information on public affairs to the Federal
government through the Federal Law of Information Access. On the side of active
supply of oversight, I also show that disclosure boosts citizens’ interaction with the
Federal ombudsman,which is inpart drivenby formaldenouncements and complaints
against public officials and institutions. On the judicial side, disclosure is followed
by an increase in the number of lawsuits filled against public agents both by public
prosecutors (i.e. Public Prosecutor General) and by ordinary citizens. At last, I show
that, in municipalities exposed to information disclosure, only the exposed political
institution displays an increase in compliance with transparency guidelines, whereas
a zero effect exist for institutions not directly exposed.
The literature on social over-watch of public institutions is mostly unable to esti-
mate any causal effect of citizens’ demand for transparency (thereof supply of over-
sight) because of the simultaneous relation between the quality of institutions and
the citizens’ level of interest/effort in enforcing accountability. On the other hand,
the existing causal evidence supporting the accountability role of private individual
agents in punishing corruption focus on the channel of agents as being voters who,
in the presence of negative information, punish public agents through elections, thus
neglecting the view of citizens as active over-watchers of the public machine.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides a picture
of Brazilian local administration and of the program exploited for disclosure of infor-
mation on the use of public funds. Section 3.3 discusses the outcomes analyzed, their
data-sources, and displays summary statistics. Section 3.4 discusses the empirical
strategy used to provide the results and that to follow in the later stages of this paper.
Finally section 3.5 presents the findings and discusses results, while further remarks
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and plans on how to develop this project are proposed in section 3.6.
3.2 Institutional background
Brazilian municipalities enjoy the status of federation members, not being subordi-
nated to the State or Federal governments. This strong decentralization lends munic-
ipal administrations, in the figure of the local executive office, to be the main actors
in local expenditures, policy implementation, and provision of basic health care, pri-
mary education, and sanitation infrastructure. Nevertheless, Brazil’s tributary struc-
ture concentrates taxes collection at the Federal and State levels, with municipal taxes
representing only 6% of total municipal revenue (Brollo and Troiano, 2016). To put
it into perspective, a third of Brazilian municipalities are not even able to generate
enough revenue to pay the salary of its mayors1
Following this centralized tax collection by Federal and State executive administra-
tions, revenue is then distributed acrossmunicipal administrations over constitutional
transfers and discretionary transfers. Most of those transfers are earmarked, meaning
they are intended by law to be invested in a specific area of public good and services
provision (e.g., mainly health, education, and sanitation).2
In response to the lack of state capacity to detect malfeasance in this highly de-
centralized administrative structure, Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), a ministry
that centralizes the government’s internal control and sets directives for promoting
efficient use of public resources, launched a program consisting of randomly assigned
audits of municipalities for their proper use of federal transfers. Since the latter rep-
resents the major part of municipal budgets, such program became a milestone tool
to deter misuse of public funds in Brazil (Avis, Ferraz and Finan, 2017).
In each round of the program, which has audited more than R$22 billion worth of
1 O Estado de S.Paulo “Um terço dos municípios do País não gera receita nem para pagar salário
do prefeito” https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,um-terco-dos-municipios-do-pais-nao-
gera-receita-nem-para-pagar-salario-do-prefeito,70002473456 (Last accessed on February 05 2019)
2 As will be discussed in depth in section 3.3, the centralized nature of tax collection - which feeds
municipal budgets with revenue to be invested in specific areas - make it reasonable for citizens to
requests information and fill complaints over local issues directly to the federal government.
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federal transfers, municipalities are randomly chosen for inspection through publicly
held lotteries. Once municipalities are drafted, CGU sends a team of auditors to
cross-check accounts and documents, inspect the delivery of public services, and
verify the existence and quality of infrastructure to which the federal transfers were
intended. Shortly after the information from field inspections are reported to CGU’s
central office, detailed reports with the results for each inspected municipality are
published on-line and sent to the competent authorities, including federal courts and
the local judiciary, with visible repercussion in the media and to federal, state, and
local authorities (refer to Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Litschig and Zamboni, 2016;
Avis, Ferraz and Finan, 2017; Muço, 2017, for specific examples).3.
From 2006, on the 20th round of the program, the audit reports started to be
compiled internally byCGU into readabledata, containing thedates of the lotteries and
report release, the area to which the fund should have been invested, the government
program to which the transfer was attached, the amount transferred, and the quantity
of irregularities found classified as formal/procedural, moderate, or severe, according
todegree ofmateriality and compromise to the program. In later versions of this paper,
as will be further discussed in section 3.4, I will use the number of irregularities as well
as their severity to try and decompose this effect of exposure between a simple change
in the perceived relevance of the topic after it is suddenly brought up (i.e. exposure vs
non-exposure) and eventual heterogeneity according to the intensity of public funds
misuse.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Below I describe the outcomes from each sub-block mentioned in the introduction
along with summary statistics. Table 1 displays it for the overall sample as well as
disaggregated by treatment group.
3 Reports can be accessed and downloaded through http://auditoria.cgu.gov.br/, under Fiscalização
em Entes Federativos - Municípios > Fiscalização Sorteio de Municípios
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Demand for information For the outcomes on citizen’s request for information on
public affairs, data were obtained from eSIC, the Electronic Information System to
Citizens, from the Brazilian Federal Government. eSIC is an online platform through
which citizens can exercise their right to access of information, introduced by the Law
of Access to Information (LAI - law number 12.527, passed in 2011).
The outcomes are defined as follows, while descriptive statistics for these variables
are presented in panel A of table 1: # Requests refers to the total number of requests for
information/data on public affairs coming from amunicipality;Natural person regards
the number of requests whose requester is an individual (Pessoa física) in contrast
with an institution; Local services refers to the number of requests regarding Health,
Education or Sanitation, which are the main attributions of the local government, as
discussed in section 3.2.
Furthermore, in an attempt to rule out that the number of requests is being driven
by specific groups, such as journalists gathering input for writing news or politicians
gathering information, for instance, to produce bad campaigning against adversaries,
I disaggregate the number of requests into the following subgroups: Journalist refers to
requestswhose requesters are self-declared journalists; Public servant regards the num-
ber of requests whose requesters are self-declared public servants; Politician concerns
the number of requests whose requesters are self-declared politicians; andComplement
is simply the number of requests whose requesters are natural person (Pessoa física)
excluding those belonging to the aforementioned categories.
One last measure of interest is Days to reply, which measures the number of days
it took for the eSIC system to provide the requester with the first answer. This last
variable is important because any eventual difference in the number of days to reply
between audited and non-audited municipalities may suggest that treatment effect
comes not only from the inspection but also from a supply-side adjustment in the
provision of information.
Supply of oversight Data on interactions between citizens and the Federal Ombuds-
manwere obtained from eOuv, The ElectronicOmbudsman system, from the Brazilian
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Federal Government. eOuv is an online platform through which citizens can fill for-
mal and anonymous denouncements and complaints against public-service providers
or individuals public agents.
The outcomes are defined as follows, while descriptive statistics for these variables
are presented in panel B of table 1: # Contacts refers the total number of citizen-
to-federal-ombudsman contacts, coming from a municipality; Denouncement regards
the interactions, from the total number of contacts, algorithmically classified by the
eOuv system as being a denouncement; Complaints refers to the number of contacts
algorithmically classified by the eOuv system as a complaint; while Compliments, for
which I expect either a negative relationwith being audited or nodifference at all, is the
number of contacts algorithmically classified by the eOuv system as a compliments.
Following the same reasoning as for eSIC,Days to replymeasures the number of days it
took for the system to provide the citizen with the first answer, for which there should
be no difference between the two groups.
Rule of law Data on judicial outcomeswere provided by a third party, being scraped
directly from courts. The outcomes are defined as follows, while descriptive statis-
tics for these variables are presented in panel C of table 1. # Lawsuits: refers to
the total number of lawsuits filled against public agents in the municipality; # De-
fendants/lawsuit: regards the average number of defendants represented per lawsuit;
# Issues/lawsuit: concerns the average number of issues (“violations”) presented per
lawsuit; Prosecutor General: is a dummy for lawsuits whose plaintiff is the Public Pros-
ecutor General (Ministério Público); and Natural person: is the number of lawsuits
whose plaintiff is an individual (Pessoa física) in contrast with an institution.
Local supply of transparency As the first measure of local compliance with trans-
parency guidelines I use the indicator of adoption of a local eOuv by the municipal
institutions. This programaims at spreading the adoption of an ombudsman along the
lines of the federal eOuv at local institutions, having reached signatory entities across
366 municipalities by May 2018. It provides the source code for the municipality-
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adapted version of e-Ouv free of charge, with no need for the institution to install the
system locally, along with technical support and training.
The program works upon voluntary adoption at the institutional level (in contrast
with the municipal level), therefore the variables Prefecturewhether the mayor cabinet
signed the adoption term of the program and Legislative whether the local legislative
chamber signed the adoption term of the program. An important remark is that the
municipal executive office, in the figure of the Prefecture, is the ultimate responsible
for implementing policies and incurring expenses, thus being the one to blame in
case of misuse of funds. For this reason, the Prefecture is considered the exposed
institution once the reports are disclosed, while the legislative chamber is taken as a
comparative group. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in panel D
of table 1.
Transparent Brazil For the second measure of local compliance with transparency
guidelines I use an indicator of whether municipal institutions signed a commitment
term to improve their access to information according to the LAI - law number 12.527.
Up to December 2017, 1,566 municipalities had at least one signatory institution.
This program aims at improving transparency in public management by providing
public servants with training on the LAI and how to comply with it. The training also
comprises how to structure and publish open data on local public affairs and on how
to install a local eSIC following the standards of the Federal eSIC. The program works
upon voluntary adoption at the institutional level (in contrast with the municipal
level), therefore the variable Prefecture indicates whether the mayor cabinet signed the
commitment term whereas Legislative indicates whether the local legislative chamber
signed it. The same reasoning for the local eOuv applies here; since the Prefecture
is the one to blame in case of misuse of funds, it is considered as the institution
exposed by the report, while the legislative chamber is taken as a comparative group.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in panel E of table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
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3.4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy adopted is a difference-in-differences with an exogenously
assigned treatment, where i denotes the municipality and t denotes the quarter. The
current specification is as follows in equation 1, where αi is the municipal fixed effect,
λt is the quarter fixed effect, and publishedit is a dummy that assumes value 1 after the
report is published in the auditedmunicipalitymunicipality i. This implies that β is the
first causal effect of interest, measuring the average effect of disclosure of information
regardless of the type of information released (i.e irrespective to the intensity ofmisuse
reported)
(1) yit  β publishedit + αi + λt + εit
In later versions, however, I consider using the specification shown in 2, which will
absorb the effect of the report release while taking in consideration the intensity of
the misuse reported, whose effect is measured by β1. Moreover, X
′
it is a vector of
time-variant controls also to be included.
(2) yit  β1(publishedit × in f ringementsi) + β2 publishedit + αi + λt + X′itδ + εit
3.5 Results
In this section I present results to support the hypothesis raised thus far. In the first
step, results point that citizen’s interest in public management increase after a leveling
in the otherwise asymmetric information on the quality ofmanagement. Those results
are in line with anecdotal evidence of citizens denouncements (named by CGU as
denúncia cidadã or citizen denouncement), which lead to legal investigations that
held corrupt agents accountable and to face prosecution, as is the case for instance
of Operation Xeque Mate, in which a citizen complaint presented to CGU lead to
investigations regarding themisuse of earmarked transfers in the amount of R$ 424,695
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(or about US$ 105,150).4
Demand for transparency After the release of reports, audited municipalities show
an increase of 7.448% in the total number of requests, of whichmore than 50% are from
individual citizens - in contrast with institutions. Notice that most of this increase is
driven by requests regarding education, health or sanitation. Moreover, results in
columns (5)-(7) in table 2 rule out that media, politicians, and bureaucrats are the
responsibles for this increase in demand of transparency.
At last, the estimate for days to reply, in column (8), is virtually zero both statistically
and in absolute value when confronted to the sample mean, which is 15.401 days.
This is a comforting results as it supports that this increase in demand for public
information isn’t being driven by an increase in Federal efficiency targeted to audited
municipalities.
[Table 2 about here.]
Supply of oversight In table 3 we see that just as in the case of eSIC, the release of
reports causes a 50% increase in the total numberof contacts to the federal ombudsman,
which is mostly driven by denouncements and complaints. For compliments, which
is reasonable to expect either a negative relation with being audited or no difference
at all, we see it is the latter. Moreover, the estimate for days to reply, in column (5), is
also virtually zero both statistically and in absolute value., which reinforces that this
increase in supply of oversight isn’t being driven by an increase in Federal efficiency
targeted to audited municipalities.
[Table 3 about here.]
Legal source of accountability? Table 4 shows, as expected, an increase in the num-
ber of filled lawsuits against public officials following the release of audit reports -
4Not only operations like this make responsibles accountable, they also prevent further misuse. In
the case operation Xeque Mate, the accused institution was in the list to receive other additional R$
4 mil (or about US$ 989,694). http://ouvidorias.gov.br/raio-ouvidorizador/cgu-e-pf-desarticulam-
desvios-praticados-por-associacao-de-enxadristas-em-rondonia (Last access on February 12 2019)
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column (1). It also shows that the number of defendants indicted per lawsuit increases
- column (2) - as well as the number of different accusations within the same lawsuit
- column (3). This phenomenon is expected even in the absence of citizens’ oversight,
since public institutions such as the Public Prosecutor General (hereafter PG) would
likely fill suits against those involved in the newly found malfeasance anyway.
Although the PG usually acts by itself in defense of society best interest, it is also
responsible to intervene upon denouncements made directly by ordinary citizens,
since the latter are less likely to pursue legal accountability against public officials if
they have to incur all the costs of doing so by themselves.5
Because it is not possible to disentangle lawsuits filled by PG acting upon de-
nouncements made directly by ordinary citizens from those in which the PG would
file a suit even in the absence of citizens’ denouncements, in column (4) I display the
estimate for all suits in which the PG is a plaintiff. This accounts for barely two-thirds
of the increase in the total number of filled lawsuits, as expected. On the other hand,
column (5) displays the estimate for all suits in which at least one direct plaintiff is a
natural person (in contrast with an institution). Although it is a noisy measure, since
it doesn’t account for cases in which the PG acting upon citizens denouncements but
the citizen is not a plaintiff herself, I still find a positive estimate.
At last, column (6) displays an estimate of 4.524 days-difference in the length
of judicial cases between audited and non-audited jurisdictions. This is not only
statistically insignificant, but also economically, when confronted to the average length
of 376 days. Such result is analogous to that of days to reply in the case of eSIC and
eOuv. This suggests to some extent that the efficiency of the judicial system is not
being affected by the report disclosure itself.
[Table 4 about here.]
Supply of Transparency Table 5 shows that audited municipalities present an im-
provement in transparency measures and in effort to support transparency, such as
5 Every Brazilian citizen is entitled to propose a popular judicial action (ação popular, which is legislated
by law 4.717, 1965) against abusive behavior committed by public agents.
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adopting a local ombudsman and partnering with the federal government to imple-
ment best practices in public transparency.
An important remark is that the municipal executive office, i.e the Prefecture, is
the ultimate responsible for implementing policies and incurring expenses using the
transfer received from higher levels of government. Therefore, the prefecture is the
main institution exposed by the reports, as it is the one to blame in case of misuse of
funds. The legislative is not entitled to incur costs with funds from those transfers,
as well as not being involved in bidding processes, where infringements such as
over-invoincing occur. This said, it is interesting that after disclosure of information,
prefectures become more likely to sign the commitment term while local chambers
are inert.
[Table 5 about here.]
Given the simultaneity between supply and demandwhen observingmarket equi-
librium, the results presented in table 5 support that local institutions are shifting
their supply curve. This would reveal a higher demand-level for transparency at the
municipal level even in the absence of any structural increase in citizens’ engagement.
This prevents us from interpreting the results shown for eSIC and eOuv as an approx-
imation to the magnitude of demand for public information and supply of oversight
at the local level.
3.6 Final remarks
In sum, results suggest that, on average, disclosure of information on misuse of pub-
lic funds (i) increases citizens’ demand for information on public affairs, (ii) boosts
citizens interaction with the Federal ombudsman, also increasing the number of de-
nouncements and complaints against public officials and institutions, (iii) increases
the number of lawsuits filled against public agents both by public prosecutors and
by ordinary citizens, and (iv) promotes compliance with transparency guidelines by
the exposed institutions. Those results, nevertheless, need additional scrutiny, and
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a brief research plan for further developments is describe as follows: To disentangle
the effect of saliency of simply bringing the topic of proper use of public funds from
the effect of release of information on misuse of public funds, I need to include the
number of infringements in regression. Moreover, supposing that those phenomena
happen through consumption of information, it is reasonable to expect the media
market to have a strong role in popularizing the information found in those reports.
Therefore, measures of internet penetration as well as radio and tv broadcasts in the
municipalities is needed.
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Table 1: Summary statistics - Information requests (eSIC) & Federal Ombudsman
(eOUV), Legal accountability, Adoption of ombudsman, Transparent Brazil
Variables Overall audited=0 audited=1mean sd mean sd mean sd
(A) Information requests (eSIC)
# Requests 3.270 8.416 3.101 8.609 4.382 6.918
Natural person 3.079 8.317 2.934 8.551 4.039 6.495
Local services 1.167 3.414 1.094 3.370 1.647 3.654
Complement 2.184 4.877 2.059 4.760 3.003 5.516
Journalist 0.041 1.312 0.044 1.405 0.025 0.228
Politician 0.017 0.300 0.018 0.315 0.014 0.173
Public servant 0.838 6.443 0.813 6.820 0.998 2.924
Days to reply 14.35 34.20 13.97 31.64 16.84 47.68
Municipalities 3,499 3,100 399
(B) Federal Ombudsman (eOUV)
# Contacts 2.198 4.879 2.047 3.081 3.692 12.73
Denouncement 0.810 1.750 0.751 1.231 1.390 4.235
Complaints 0.659 2.717 0.605 2.043 1.192 6.213
Compliments 0.027 0.279 0.024 0.279 0.052 0.287
Days to reply 21.27 48.12 21.20 48.42 22.03 44.99
Municipalities 3,131 2,891 240
(C) Legal accountability
#Lawsuits 3.555 7.670 3.336 7.798 4.665 6.882
#Defendants/lawsuit 9.355 23.48 8.758 23.50 12.38 23.12
#Issues/lawsuit 9.842 36.37 9.052 38.19 13.84 24.92
Prosecutor 2.307 5.518 2.168 5.604 3.012 5.008
Natural person 0.428 3.738 0.419 4.051 0.472 1.279
Municipalities 1,388 1,204 184
(D) Adoption of ombudsman
Prefecture 0.023 0.149 0.022 0.146 0.056 0.229
Legislative 0.002 0.044 0.002 0.042 0.007 0.086
Municipalities 3,577 3,487 90
(E) Transparent Brazil
Prefecture 0.165 0.371 0.158 0.365 0.216 0.412
Legislative 0.017 0.127 0.016 0.124 0.023 0.150
Municipalities 3,936 3,487 449
101
Table 2: Difference-in-differences estimates: Effect of Audits release on requests for information through eSIC
# Requests Natural person Local services Complement 5-7 Journalist Politician Public servant Days to reply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Published 0.503** 0.489** 0.250** 0.349* 0.006 0.039 0.095 0.411
(0.221) (0.229) (0.127) (0.188) (0.020) (0.042) (0.092) (1.304)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
State trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.720 0.705 0.597 0.711 0.214 0.344 0.353 0.163
%∆ from Baseline 7.448 7.386 5.951 5.939 0.154 0.511 2.605 2.668
Municipalities 3,536 3,536 3,536 3,536 3,536 3,536 3,536 3,536
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Audits release on requests for information on public management to the Federal Government,
through eSIC Sistema Eletronico do Servico de Informaco ao Cidadao. # Requests is the total number of requests coming from a municipality; Natural person denotes an
individual (represented by a social security number) in contrast with an institution; Local services denotes to requests regarding Health, Education or Sanitation, which
are themain attributions of the local government; Complement 5-7 refers to all requests excluding those coming from the classes considered in columns (5) to (7); Journalist,
Politician, and Public servant denote requests whose requesters exerted each of those functions, respectively; Days to reply denotes the numbers of days it took between
the request was made and the first reply regarding the information requested. %∆ from Baseline is the relative variation of βˆDID with respect to the outcomes’ mean
value for the control group. Specifications include municipality fixed effects, Quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level are presented in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Table 3: Difference-in-differences estimates: Effect of Audits release on Citizens’ inter-
actions with the Federal Ombudsman, through eOUV.
Full sample # Contacts Denouncement Complaints Compliments Days to reply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Published 1.560** 0.388* 0.732** -0.002 0.023
(0.723) (0.210) (0.341) (0.017) (0.981)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter F.E YES YES YES YES YES
State trend YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.453 0.369 0.403 0.203 0.140
Mean Baseline 3.5813 1.9021 3.1837 1.6331 23.3046
%∆ from Baseline 43.565 20.419 22.976 -0.110 0.099
Municipalities 3,149 3,149 3,149 3,149 3,149
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Audits release on Citizens’
interactions with the Federal Ombudsman, through eOUV. # Contacts is the total number of contacts
coming from a municipality; Denouncement, Complaints, and Compliments denote the class of contact;
Days to reply denotes the numbers of days it took for the Ombudsman office to reply the citizen regarding
the deference of the issue reported. %∆ from Baseline is the relative variation of βˆDID with respect to the
outcomes’ mean value for the control group. Specifications include municipality fixed effects, Quarter
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates: Effect of Audits release on lawsuits against public officials.
# Lawsuits # Defendants/suit # Issues/suit Prosecutor General Natural person
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Published 0.675** 2.016** 2.487** 0.429** 0.076*
(0.311) (0.896) (1.182) (0.168) (0.044)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter F.E YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.345 0.295 0.316 0.304 0.207
%∆ from Baseline 23.818 25.487 34.513 17.361 4.073
Municipalities 1,351 1,351 1,351 1,351 1,351
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Audits release on lawsuits against public officials.
# Lawsuits refers to the number of lawsuits classified as administrative improbity filled against public officials, # Defendants/suit
refers to the number of defendants accused in a given lawsuit, # Issues/suit refers to the number of law-infringement accusations
within the same suit, Prosecutor General refers to lawsuits for which the plaintiff in the Prosecutor General (Ministerio Publico),
Natural person denotes an individual in contrast with an institution, and Length refers to the length in days between the registration
of the lawsuit in the judicial system and the date this data was scraped for lawsuits that were not sentenced yet. %∆ from Baseline is
the relative variation of βˆDID with respect to the outcomes’ mean value for the control group. Specifications include municipality
fixed effects, Quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences estimates: Effect of Audits release on
local supply of transparency.
Adoption of ombudsman Transparent Brazil
Prefecture Legislative Prefecture Legislative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Published 0.042*** -0.001 0.027*** 0.002
(0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
Municipality F.E YES YES YES YES
Year F.E YES YES YES YES
State trend YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.842 0.830 0.893 0.894
%∆ from Baseline 4.160 -0.100 2.660 0.020
Municipalities 3,577 3,577 3,936 3,936
Note: This table presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Audits
release on measures of supply of transparency by the public institutions as measured
byAdesao eOuv municipios, andAdesao Brasil Transparente. Adoption of ombudsman refers
to whether the municipality signed a term to implement a local ombudsman eOuv;
Transparent Brasil refers to whether the municipality signed a term to implement better
practices in transparency and adopt a local eSIC; Prefecture denotes whether the mayor
hall signed the term, Legislative denotes whether the local legislative chamber signed
the term. %∆ fromBaseline is the relative variation of βˆDID with respect to the outcomes’
mean value for the control group. Specifications include municipality fixed effects,
Year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level are presented in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively.
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